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ABSTRACT

Even if they do not realize it, readers are perpetually in a condition that is strikingly
similar to that of the Good Samaritan. Right now they have access to a vast network of
communication that both enhances their senses and increases their sphere of influence. They can,
for example, sit down at a computer and click on a certain combination of ―sites‖ and the result
will be that, in two weeks (or sooner), a DVD will arrive on their doorstep. Or, they can choose
another combination, and the result will be that, in about two weeks (or less), a child will be
saved from starvation and dehydration in some distant and destitute nation. Like the Good
Samaritan, a reader of this thesis can see the desperate need of others and they have the ability to
affect their condition. This perpetual Good Samaritan condition is directly a result of the recent
changes the world has undergone as a result of technological advancement.
This thesis is an exploration of the ethical implications of the potential perpetual good
Samaritan. I will argue that (1) affluent individuals are able to affect positively the global poor
and that they have a moral obligation to do so, (2) that this moral obligation is limited insofar as
fulfilling the obligation requires a moral agent to sacrifice something of substantial significance
(i.e., something that would cause a long term decrease in happiness), and (3) fulfilling this
obligation requires specific actions on political, social, and individual levels.
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Dedication: To ―the least of these.‖
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INTRODUCTION: OUR SHRINKING WORLD
A Prefatory Remark for the Skeptical Reader
This thesis is perhaps nothing more than the ramblings of someone who is suffering from
what some might see as liberal guilt, a condition characterized by feelings of guilt about being
affluent in a world where many live in abject poverty. On the other hand, perhaps this thesis is
more than that. Perhaps it is the result of a more desirable condition: a condition that compels me
to explore and follow the dictates of reason. It will be left to the reader to determine which of
these two statements accurately describes what follows, for what follows is an inveighance
against the inimical iniquity of death dealing indigence amongst affluence.
Our Shrinking World
Even if they do not realize it, readers are perpetually in a condition that is strikingly
similar to that of the Good Samaritan. Right now, they have access to a vast network of
communication that both enhances their senses and increases their sphere of influence.1 They
can, for example, sit down at a computer and click on a certain combination of ―sites‖ and the
result will be that, in two weeks (or sooner), a DVD will arrive on their doorstep. Or, they can
choose another combination, and the result will be that, in about two weeks (or less), a child will
be saved from starvation and dehydration in some distant and destitute nation. Like the Good
Samaritan, the reader can see the desperate need of others and they have the ability to affect their
1

Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, Critical ed. (Corte Madera CA: Gingko Press,

2003), 337.

1

situation. This perpetual Good Samaritan situation puts moral agents in a seemingly absurd
position: they have to choose between satisfying their movie craving and saving the life of a
child. This interesting dilemma is directly a result of recent technological advancement and the
subsequent ―shrinking of the world.‖
Indeed, the ubiquity of the recognition that the world is a qualitatively different place as a
result of technological proliferation is staggering. President John F. Kennedy began his inaugural
address in 1961 by recognizing that ―…the world is very different now. For man holds in his
mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life.‖ 2 A
little over thirty years ago, communications scholar John Edgar ruminated on the ramifications of
technological proliferation, ―[technology] is a force for change throughout the world that simply
will not be stopped, no matter how it is resisted…are we ready for the consequences of this
change? Are we prepared to consider the profound social, legal, economic, and political effects
of technology around the world?‖3 Philosopher John Caputo describes our situation this way,
Today, when we hitch a ride on the electronic circuits that form the invisible ribs of a vast
virtual world we soar like pure spirits, sailing effortlessly and with breathtaking speed
across staggering distances. We make a mockery of ‗matter‘…when you hit a bit of
hypertext in a text, you are invited to spread your cybernetic wings…to lift yourself
beyond the limits of the room in which you are seated, to sail across the seas, to enter an
old library or to explore some distant ‗site‘ which is but a point and click away.4

2

Simon Sebag Montefiore, Speeches that Changed the World: The Stories and Transcripts of the Moments that

Made History (London: Quercus Pub., 2007), 142.
3

John M. Eger, ―A Time for Decision,‖ Journal of Communication 29 (Winter 1979): 204-207.

4

John Caputo, On religion (London: New York: Routledge, 2001), 73-74.
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Anthropologist Thomas De Zengotita recognizes that, ―…there has been a convergence of the
digital and the biogenetic that will lead eventually to a full-blown merger between the real and
the representational in every department of our lives…reality is becoming indistinguishable from
representation in a qualitatively new way.‖5 Friedman, a columnist for The New York Times,
gives the appellation ―Globalization 3.0‖ to describe our current world. He defines the word this
way, ―Globalization 3.0 is shrinking the world from a size small to a size tiny…[it] is the
newfound power for individuals to collaborate and compete globally…individuals from every
corner of the flat world are being empowered.‖6
Prior to the proliferation of technology, both knowledge of morally problematic
circumstances and the ability to affect said circumstances were directly related to geography:
only those who were close to the problem had to consider their ethical obligations towards
rectifying the problem. Perhaps the two main responses to the growing irrelevance of
geographical distance in our social, economic, and political endeavors can be broadly
categorized in the following way: there are those who have sought to decrease the ―moral
distance‖ between the affluent and the starving thereby generating moral obligation of the former
towards the latter and there have been those who, through various claims ranging from ―selfdefeating aid‖ to ―meta-ethical particularism,‖ have sought to increase the ―moral distance‖
between the wealthy and the destitute, which absolves the wealthy of any obligation.
5

Thomas De Zengotita, Mediated: How the Media Shapes Your World and the Way You Live in it (New York:

Bloomsbury, 2006), 18.
6

Thomas Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century, 1st ed. (New York: Farrar

Straus and Giroux, 2005), 10-11. (emphasis original)
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This thesis is essentially an answer to a very natural question to ask when one recognizes
the shift the world has undergone and the subsequent philosophical discussion regarding our
ethical obligations: What new moral obligations arise out of this technological advancement and
how can we fulfill these obligations? My answer is this: 1) technological advancement affects
our sphere of influence and our concepts of community in a way that results in new ethical
obligations towards those who require life-saving care regardless of their geographical location,
2) our duties to behave benevolently to the world‘s desperately poor are limited insofar as
exercising those duties requires a sacrifice of something substantively significant (i.e., something
that will result in a long term decrease in happiness), but our duty to begin valuing benevolence
over other ―substantively significant‖ endeavors is unlimited, and 3) fulfilling these obligations
requires consistent and coordinated effort to deliver effective aid, eliminate unfair economic
arrangements, and motivate individuals on a psychological level to aspire to behave more
benevolently.
The purpose of this introduction is twofold. The first part of the introduction will map out
the flow of the thesis. The second part of the introduction will address some of the limits,
assumptions, and methods of which I make use for this thesis. With that being said, I turn now to
the first point of discussion in this introduction.
Although there have been at least two attempts at providing a probative and ecumenical
account (i.e., an account that does not rely on any particular moral framework or addresses the
problem from various ethical perspectives) of our obligations to the distant destitute, these
attempts have been plagued with conceptual difficulties that ultimately seem to undermine their
cogency. For Peter Singer in ―Famine, Affluence, and Morality‖, use of the term ―morally
4

relevant‖ in the formulation of his premises (an attempt at being ecumenical) highlighted the
vagueness of his argumentation, which made it an apt target for criticism.7 The shortcoming in
Thomas Pogge‘s argumentation (in ―Real World Justice‖) is that he assumes that libertarian
ideology is coherent and can coherently be applied at the global level, which is a claim that has
been perpetually challenged.8 Thus, the first chapter of the thesis will be dedicated to providing
an ecumenical account of the affluent‘s obligation to the global poor that avoids the
aforementioned difficulties.
Philosophers across the board seem to recognize that the proliferation of technology has
had the result of making distant relations morally equivalent to proximate relations (Hardin,
Singer, Unger, O‘Neill, Rachels, Fletcher, Pogge, etc.). Thus, the difficulty in establishing
obligation to the impecunious is not that philosophers contest that distant situations are morally
equivalent to proximate ones. Instead, as Jan Narveson points out, even if, morally speaking,
there are starving people ―right next to us,‖ it is not immediately clear to all that we have any
obligations to them.9
Narveson identifies the moral paradigm underlying the ―intuitive‖ denial that we have
any obligations to others as the ―conservative-libertarian‖ paradigm. Judith Jarvis Thomson‘s

7

John Arthur, ―Rights and the Duty to Bring Aid,‖ in World Hunger and Morality, ed. William Aiken and Hugh La

Follette, 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, 1996), 39.
8

Michael Blake, ―International Justice (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy),‖ in Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2005), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/international-justice/.
9

Jan Narveson, ―Morality and Starvation,‖ in World Hunger and Moral Obligation, ed. William Aiken and Hugh La

Follette, 1st ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 49-65.
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quote in ―A Defense of Abortion‖ is representative of this view, ―Surely we do not have any such
‗special responsibility‘ for a person unless we have assumed it, explicitly or implicitly.‖10 To
establish ethical obligation within the libertarian-conservative paradigm, I will present three
arguments drawing heavily on insights from Thomas Pogge, William Aiken, James Sterba, and
Onora O‘Neil. Specifically, the first argument seeks to establish that the world‘s rich are harming
the global poor. The second argument casts the world hunger issue as one of conflicting liberties,
and argues that the poor ought not to be expected to have their liberty limited in a way that
condemns them for trying to save their lives (by procuring resources from the rich). The final
argument claims that within an ethical paradigm that takes liberty as one its central values, life, a
necessary precondition for liberty, should also be taken seriously, i.e., positive efforts should be
made to preserve life.11
Nel Noddings‘ infamous question, ―Starving children in Africa, who cares?‖ typifies
another response to the problem of world hunger: the partialist one.12 This response is
characterized by the claim that because the world‘s poor are outside of our community, we do
not have obligations to them. Justifications for partialism typically rest on concepts like
10

Judith Jarvis Thomson, ―A Defense of Abortion,‖ in Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues, ed.

Steven M. Cahn and Peter Markie (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 747.
11

This will undoubtedly be the most difficult pill for libertarians to swallow since it rests on the derivation of

positive duties. Some may object to the idea that this is truly ecumenical, noting that the notion of non volunteerist
positive duty is entirely foreign to the libertarian ethical paradigm. However, this account is still ecumenical in that
it takes liberty as the central value of libertarian ethical thought and proceeds from that starting point.
12

Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics & Moral Education, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of

California Press, 2003), 86.
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―constitutive community.‖13 The typical partialist claim (whether cultural perfectionism or metaethical particularism) is that members of the same constitutive community have obligations to
one another since they, among other things, play a role in constructing that moral agent‘s
identity. The cultural homogenization that has occurred in our shrinking world provides reason to
suspect that in many cases the rich and the poor share the same ―constitutive community.‖ Thus,
I will argue that it is not inconsistent with partialistic conceptions of morality to suppose that we
have some obligation to the distant destitute.
Although it seems that there has been extensive discussion on whether or not the affluent
have an obligation to the distant destitute, the discussion regarding the demandingness of our
obligation to the indigent has been far from adequate. The debate over how far reaching our
obligations are to the poor seems to strike at the heart of moral questions: how demanding can
morality be? The previous discussion of this topic has resulted in a seemingly intractable debate.
Indeed, Henry Shue, while attempting to settle this issue, threw up his proverbial arms in
exasperation and wrote, ―either a person‘s general duties are limited or they are not…at this level
the logic is inescapable. We need a fresh perspective.‖14
The second chapter will take up that neglected project, and attempt to provide a fresh
perspective. I will begin by representing some of Robert Noggle‘s comments on the difficulties
that have befuddled philosophers in their attempt to formulate a principle of benevolence with
13

This term is borrowed from Michael Sandel. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, (New York: Cambridge

University Press), 172.
14

Henry Shue, ―Solidarity Among Strangers and the Right to Food,‖ in World Hunger and Morality, ed. William

Aiken and Hugh La Follette, 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, 1996), 124.
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regard to the world hunger question. Secondly, I will represent and criticize some seemingly
viable attempts at providing a response to how demanding our duties are to provide for those
who are suffering. Specifically, I examine Peter Singer‘s, John Arthur‘s, William Frankena‘s,
and Robert Noggle‘s attempts to understand the limit of the affluent‘s duty to the world‘s poor.
Next, I will present and defend a principle of benevolence that will, perhaps, circumvent the
problems that Noggle notes and the problems of the previously critiqued theories. This principle
might be classified as a ―moderate‖ one, and is summarized briefly as follows: our duties to
behave benevolently are limited insofar as exercising those duties requires a sacrifice of
something substantively significant (i.e., something that will result in our long term
unhappiness), but our duty to begin valuing benevolence over other ―substantively significant‖
endeavors is unlimited. Thus, we have a duty for our duty of benevolence to grow in magnitude.
The third part of the second chapter contains a further exposition of this principle and
adds caveats. Such elaborations are an attempt to capture to complexities of the lives of moral
agents, and to pay due respect to these complexities, since previous principles of benevolence, in
addition to the fact that they seem inaccurate, also are extremely vague.
The principle of benevolence that I put forth in this chapter involves an aspect that makes
moral agents look much like what Susan Wolf calls a ―loving moral saint.‖15 Thus, this ―ideal‖
moral agent is subject to all of the criticisms that Wolf levies against what she thinks are overly
demanding and intrusively all-encompassing ethical obligations. Briefly, she claims that
demanding moral obligations hinder the development of non-moral virtues, and that this results
15

Susan Wolf, ―Moral Saints,‖ in Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues, ed. Steven M. Cahn and Peter

Markie (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 709.
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in a less than ideal individual. She also makes the related claim that morality itself should not
serve as the primary motivation for all actions.
The final part of the chapter is dedicated to responding to these objections. I will draw on
several comments made in the article, ―What Moral Saints Look Like‖ to respond to Wolf‘s first
claim. I will address the second claim by exposing the normative nature of Wolf‘s comments
(and thus the ethical nature) and by arguing that Wolf cannot cogently criticize all-encompassing
moral demands and, at the same time, prescriptively suggest a ―non-moral‖ all-encompassing
ideal (what she calls the ―point of view of individual perfection‖).
The third chapter addresses what seems to be a crucial question that philosophers
neglected concerning our obligations to the needy: How do we fulfill those obligations? Indeed,
a common remark at the end of several articles on the topic all express similar sentiments: our
obligations to the impecunious are more far-reaching than many of us are currently prepared to
act on.16 Even Peter Singer has recognized this and mitigated the strength of his moral demands
on his website ―The Life You Can Save‖ (a site dedicated to raising funds for the poor) in order
to prevent people from becoming discouraged at the demandingness of morality.17
Moreover, typical prescriptions that philosophers recommend have been, at best,
parochial and, at worst, inimical. Indeed, Amartya Sen wrote at one point, ―The focus on food
per head and Malthusian optimism [as a means of helping the poor has] literally killed
16

See Peter Singer‘s ―Famine, Affluence, and Morality‖, Richard Watson‘s ―Reason and Morality in a World of

Limited Food‖, Garrett Cullity‘s ―The Life-Saving Anology‖, Hugh LaFollette and Larry May‘s ―Suffer the Little
Children‖, Henry Shue‘s ―Solidarity among Strangers and the Right to Food‖, etc. for this trend.
17

Peter Singer and Michael Slote (Philosophy TV, 2010), http://www.philostv.com/peter-singer-and-michael-slote/.
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millions.‖18 This preoccupation with conceptual issues and a lack of concern for pragmatic
implementation is perhaps a vice to which philosophers are particularly susceptible. David
Crocker, a founding member of the International Development Ethics Association, confirms this
when he notes, ―unfortunately, preoccupied as they were with the task of justifying aid to distant
people, most philosophers evinced scant interest in institutional and practical issues.‖19 The third
chapter, then, is an attempt to escape the aforementioned philosopher‘s vice. I will present
practical solutions to the problem of poverty both on an individual level and on a social/political
level.
Often times, as LaFollette notes, the ―...strongest barrier to helping those in chronic need
is more psychological than philosophical.‖20 Michael Slote‘s comments in Moral Sentimentalism
suggest that empathy is a key factor in motivating moral behavior. He notes that there are many
studies that have attempted to show this empirically.21 For the individual prescriptions, I draw on
some insights that Michael Slote and Martin Hoffman have discovered on the connection
between empathy and motivation for moral behavior.

18

Amartya Sen, ―Goods and People,‖ in World Hunger and Morality, ed. William Aiken and Hugh La Follette, 2nd

ed. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, 1996), 199.
19

David Crocker, ―Hunger, Capability, and Development,‖ in World Hunger and Morality, ed. William Aiken and

Hugh LaFollette, 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, 1996), 213.
20

Hugh LaFollette and Larry May, ―Suffer the Little Children,‖ in World Hunger and Morality, ed. William Aiken

and Hugh La Follette, 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, 1996), 80.
21

Michael Slote, Moral Sentimentalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 16.
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For the social/political prescriptions, I explore the controversial topic of development
economics. The controversy could be broadly categorized as a debate between those who
embrace a neo-liberal globalization paradigm for economic growth and those who think that
structural and institutional reforms are the key to ending poverty. Fortunately, it appears as
though there has been some recent consensus about the economic means necessary to tackle the
problem of poverty.22 I attempt to isolate some prescriptions on which the various sides on the
debate agree, and present these prescriptions as the safest bet for making strides towards ending
poverty. I also look specifically at some of the prescriptions that Thomas Pogge, Andrew Kuper,
and Dale Jameison recommend. I also discuss some of the positive results of social
entrepreneurship.
Finally, I address some objections to the notion that the affluent have an obligation to the
indigent that are based on more practical concerns. More specifically, the notion of ―selfdefeating aid‖ will be explored. Garrett Hardin is perhaps the best known philosopher who
attempted to show that we ought not to give aid to countries that have exceeded their ―carrying
capacity.‖ The result of not heeding Hardin‘s remarks will, according to him, be something like
this: ―their population [will] continue to grow unchecked and so will their ‗need‘ for aid. In the
short run, a world food bank actually may diminish the need, but in the long run it actually
increases the need without limit.‖23 I critique both the empirical and conceptual basis for
22

World Bank (Washington, DC), World Development Report 2000 2001 Attacking Poverty (Oxford [etc.]: [Oxford

University Press [etc.], 2000), 192.
23

Garrett Hardin, ―Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor,‖ in World Hunger and Moral Obligation,

ed. William Aiken and Hugh La Follette, 1st ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 17.
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Hardin‘s (and others‘) arguments against helping the poor. Next, I will argue that proper aid for
the world‘s global poor does not involve an abandoning of our economic growth. In fact, it
seems that properly appropriated dollars will have a ―boomerang effect,‖ i.e., as more and more
nations are lifted out of poverty, there will likely be some long term benefits for developed
nations‘ economies.24 These findings will be used to address what seems to be, paradoxically, a
consequentialist (which is typically characterized by impartiality) and a partialist objection to
aiding the poor, an objection that argues that we ought not to help the poor because doing so is
harmful to our economy.
I also respond to this objection by noting that generally speaking, moral actions cannot be
condemned because of the negative consequences that would result within a certain system. This
says more about the system than it does about the moral act itself, and while it maybe debatable
whether or not one should perform some action in a system that will result in negative
consequences, there is no question that the system itself if immoral or should be replaced. If this
response to the objection is correct, then the question becomes, ―how can the system be
reworked?‖, i.e., how can our economy be reconstructed in a way that efforts to help the
cadaverous children will not result in dire consequences.
Acting on Aristotle’s Ancient Aphorism: Limits and Assumptions
Towards the end of the first book of Aristotle‘s Nichomachean Ethics, he justifies his
―lack of precision‖ of explaining the exact nature of ―the good‖ by these words,

24

Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century, 428.
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… do not look for the same degree of exactness in all areas, but the degree that fits the
subject-matter in each area…For the carpenter‘s and the geometer‘s inquiries about the
right angle are different also; the carpenter‘s is confined to the right angle‘s usefulness for
his work, whereas the geometer‘s concerns what, or what sort of thing, the right angle is,
since he studies the truth. We must do the same, then, in other areas too…so that
digressions do not overwhelm our main task.25
Since there are two main fundamental questions that threaten to ―overwhelm‖ the main task of
the thesis, I find myself in a similar situation to Aristotle: I must make some initial limiting
assumptions. These assumptions involve two meta-ethical topics: the validity of moral realism
and the role intuition ought to play in ethical argumentation.
To deal adequately with the issues and objections to moral realism could certainly be a
thesis topic of its own and would be outside the scope of this thesis. However, Unger has noted
that moral realism does not need to be assumed in order for these sorts of ethical prescriptions to
be taken seriously. So, rather than assuming realism at the outset of this thesis, I will, following
Peter Unger‘s method in his work Living High or Letting Die, assume the much weaker notion
that the status of moral truths (objective or subjective) is irrelevant in determining the nature of
what is an ethical way to behave (even though I am inclined to side with moral realism).
Peter Unger imagines an interlocutor who would object to this notion. The interlocutor
might object by asking, ―What would happen if we believed there weren‘t any substantial moral
truths? Rather than feeling constrained by our deepest moral commitments, mightn‘t even we

25

Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, in Introductory readings in ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy, ed. C Reeve

and Patrick Miller (Indianapolis IN: Hackett Pub. Co., 2006), 309.
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decent folk be free to do just what we please….‖26 This objection is met by echoing Unger‘s
response. He notes that even if someone believes that there are no objective moral truths it would
not ―free them up‖ to behave in ways contrary to his or her values. He borrows an example from
James Rachels to illustrate this point: Suppose that someone has a rival heir to a large sum of
money. Suppose further that this person will receive much more money if his rival dies first.
Finally, suppose he stumbles upon this rival who is in danger of drowning. If this person does
not believe there are objective moral truths will they simply allow their rival heir to drown? ―Not
a chance‖, Unger notes, ―when clear [sic] that there‘s a great conflict between some conduct and
our Values, we avoid it like the plague.‖27 Those who read this thesis who reject objective moral
truths may consider the arguments put forth to be an attempt to clarify values that are already
possessed by the reader (objectively or subjectively). For those who reject the notion that we
have such values (again, subjectively or objectively), I am content to take David Hume‘s advice,
Those who have denied the reality of moral distinctions, may be ranked among the
disingenuous disputants; nor is it conceivable, that any human creature could ever
seriously believe, that all characters and actions were alike entitled to the affection and
regard of everyone…The only way, therefore, of converting an antagonist of this kind, is to
leave him to himself. For, finding that nobody keeps up the controversy with him, it is
probable he will, at last, of himself, from mere weariness, come over to the side of
common sense and reason.28

26

Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996),

22.
27

Ibid., 23.
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David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Principles of Morals. Section 1 ―General Principles of Morals.‖ (Project

Gutenberg, 2003), http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4320.
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The next and final meta-ethical topic that cannot be discussed in full here concerns the
role of ―moral intuition‖ in forming moral judgments. This has been attacked recently by several
ethicists.29 If I am to take Aristotle‘s advice seriously, however, I absolutely cannot defend the
use of ―moral intuition‖ in making judgments here. This need not necessarily worry the reader. I
have tried to make an appeal to intuition only when doing so will not be controversial. (e.g., I
think that it is intuitive that we ought to wade into a shallow pond to save a drowning child, but
this is an intuition to which I will not appeal since it has been contested.)
Despite the fact that a reliance on intuition may be dubitable to some, I will make use of
it because 1) doing so allows me to be free from committing myself to any particular ethical
theory (e.g., consequentialism, deontology, etc.) and 2) backing up every moral judgment
considered in this thesis using some moral theory may result in a prolixic and prattle-like
discussion since the judgments that are being justified (as noted above) are not controversial.
With these limits and assumptions in mind, I turn now to the first task of my thesis: establishing
that the affluent do have a duty to the distant destitute.

29

See Jan Narveson, ―Welfare and Wealth, Poverty and Justice in Today's World,‖ The Journal of Ethics 8, no. 4
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CHAPTER 1: MORAL MIGRATION FROM “DISTANT” NATIONS
This chapter begins with a discussion of what seem to be the most seminal articles and
books in the past discussions about world hunger since Singer‘s ―Famine, Affluence, and
Morality‖ (1971). Next, it seeks to highlight and justify some of the implicit premises of the
arguments of these authors, as these premises and arguments are important in establishing duties
to the distant. The third part of the chapter will attempt to provide an ecumenical exposition of
our ethical obligation to the indigent. Specifically, I engage libertarian and partialist perspectives
on world hunger and conclude that duties to the distant can be coherently derived within these
paradigms. I target these particular perspectives since these positions have been the least
conducive to establishing duties towards the distant destitute.
The Moral Migration of Starving Children
As mentioned in the introduction, the growing irrelevance of distance in our economic
and social interactions has been accompanied by an attempt to shrink the moral distance between
the affluent and the poor.30 Two notable philosophers who have sought to shrink the ―moral
distance‖ between the haves and have-nots are Peter Singer and Peter Unger. They have, through
their conceptual work, acted rather like Mosaic figures. They have essentially led an exodus
(morally speaking) of starving persons from the destitute third world to the promised land of the
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pocketbooks of the affluent. This exodus is evidence of the first effect of our shrinking world:
distant relations can now be assessed morally as though they are proximate relations. Essentially,
Singer and Unger have claimed that, morally speaking, there are starving children in our living
room and we ought to do something about it. This discussion will be focused on representing the
Singer and Unger‘s arguments on the first claim, and making explicit their implicit premises that
allow them to draw this conclusion.
Peter Singer likens our condition as affluent individuals to a person coming across a
drowning child in a pond, and (using principles that will be discussed later) he concludes that,
―…if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and
pull the child out.‖31 Moreover, he claims that,
…instant communication and swift transportation have changed the situation. From the
moral point of view, the development of the world into a ‗global village‘ has made an
important…difference to our moral situation. Expert observers and supervisors, sent out by
famine relief organizations or permanently stationed in famine-prone areas, can direct our
aid to a refugee in Bengal almost as effectively as we could get it to someone in our own
block. There would seem, therefore, to be no possible justification for discriminating on
geographical grounds.32
Peter Unger does more extensive work in showing that, morally speaking, we are in a
position similar to a person stumbling upon a drowning child. He does this by presenting two
analogies: ―The Sedan‖ and ―The Envelope‖.
Here is his Sedan analogy reproduced largely in its entirety,
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…your one luxury in life is a vintage Mercedes sedan that…you've restored to mint
condition. In particular, you're pleased by the auto's fine leather seating. One day, you stop
at the intersection of two small country roads both lightly traveled. Hearing a voice
screaming for help, you get out and see a man who's wounded…Assuring you that his
wound's confined to one of his legs, the man also informs you that he was a medical
student for two full years and…he's knowledgeably tied his shirt near the wound so as to
stop the flow. So, there's no urgent danger of losing his life, you're informed, but there's
great danger of losing his limb. This can be prevented, however, if you drive him to a rural
hospital fifty miles away…Now, if you'd aid this trespasser, you must lay him across your
fine back seat. But, then, your fine upholstery will be soaked through with blood, and
restoring the car will cost over five thousand dollars. So, you drive away. Picked up the
next day by another driver, he survives but loses the wounded leg.33
Peter Unger claims that, intuitively, it seems like a ―severe moral failing‖ if an individual was
unwilling to ruin his upholstery in his car in order to save this strange bird watcher‘s leg. He
then presents another analogy,
In your mailbox, there's something from (the U.S. Committee for) UNICEF- After reading
it through, you correctly believe that, unless you soon send in a check for $100, then,
instead of each living many more years, over thirty more children will die soon. But, you
throw the material in your trash basket, including the convenient return envelope provided,
you send nothing, and, instead of living many years, over thirty more children soon die
than would have had you sent in the requested $100.23.34
Unger then notes that, intuitively, this action does not seem to be in the same category as the
above analogy, i.e., a ―serious moral failing.‖ His project then becomes one of showing both
why these disparate intuitive assessments exist and why they need to be revised. His answer is
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that the difference in our intuitive assessments is a result of ―psychological distortions‖ due to
the distance of the individual, and is not actually reflective of our real moral principles.35
Unger is not the first to recognize that psychological distortions related to distance can
affect our moral assessments. Unger‘s claim is an echo of the sentiments of David Hume in his
most sentiment-focused treatise, An Inquiry Concerning Principles of Morals. Hume notes that,
…small benefit done to ourselves, or our near friends, excites more lively sentiments of
love and approbation than a great benefit done to a distant commonwealth: But still we
know here…to correct these inequalities by reflection, and retain a general standard of vice
and virtue, founded chiefly on a general usefulness.36
Psychological distortions do indeed seem to be at work because of the distance between the
world‘s rich and poor. This is actually something that will be explored in greater detail in the
third chapter. For now, it is enough to note that psychological states are not considered
particularly relevant to making moral judgments within the two paradigms that I examine in
this chapter.
In both of the Singer and Unger‘s work we find implicit criteria for determining
whether a situation can be evaluated morally. The first is relevant knowledge of the problem.
The second is the ability to rectify it. Perhaps both of these criteria can be encapsulated by the
maxim that ―ought implies can,‖ since both knowledge of the situation and the ability to
rectify it are a part of the ―can.‖
35
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Distance is only relevant to determining whether an action can be evaluated morally
insofar as it affects the aforementioned criteria. By slightly altering the drowning child
analogy, I will attempt to justify this claim. Suppose that instead of an able bodied person
stumbling upon the drowning child that a paraplegic person does. Clearly, this person is
immune to any moral obligation to wade into the pool to save the drowning child. Note also
that he is equally immune to moral obligation regardless of his location in relation to the
drowning child. Suppose also, that instead of noticing the child as the person walks by the
pond, the person is too busy on a cell phone to recognize that the child is in danger. Again,
here this distracted individual is certainly free from any moral censure since both persons
cannot do anything to save the drowning child. At one point in time distance was the obstacle
both for knowledge of morally problematic situations and efficaciousness of affecting those
situations, but in a shrinking world, this simply does not seem to be the case.
The Road Less Traveled: An Ecumenical Exposition of Ethical Obligation
It would seem that at least the first part of Singer and Unger‘s claim is true. There are
indeed starving children in the living rooms of the affluent, but their second claim, that we
ought to do something about it, is far from obvious for some. Interestingly, as Jan Narveson
notes, it is ―self-evident‖ to some that we ought to help a starving child in our living room, yet
it is ―self-evident‖ to others that we have no moral obligation to help that child at all.37 One
man‘s axiom is another man‘s specious speculation.
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Narveson provides some insight into what appears to be an axiomatic standoff. He
uncovers the two moral paradigms that generate these ―axioms‖ which reveals that they are
not basic propositions at all, but they are, instead, based on other principles. Narveson gives a
name to each position: libertarian-conservatives are those who believe that they have no
obligation to the starving children in their living room and ―liberals‖ who believe that they
clearly do. I will add to these two categories one other: partialists who believe that our
legitimate favoritism towards ―our own‖ results in eliminating any duties to the distant.
It may be helpful in clarifying these positions to represent some of the claims of
proponents of these positions. The words of Michael Ignatieff, Judith Thomson, and Nel
Noddings are representative of the liberal, conservative-libertarian, and partialist views
respectively. Ignatieff, in The Needs of Strangers claims that ―the ground zero of human
obligation is that this common humanity is reason enough for a claim on another‘s
superfluity.‖38 Thomson states in her famous article, ―A Defense of Abortion,‖ ―surely we do
not have any such ‗special responsibility‘ for a person unless we have assumed it, explicitly or
implicitly.‖39 Finally, Nel Noddings‘ infamous rhetorical question, ―Starving children in
Africa, who cares?‖ typifies a partialist response to world hunger.40
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At this conceptual crossroad, I will take the road less traveled: the ecumenical one.
Following the ecumenical approaches used by Singer, Thomas Pogge, and William Frankena,
the rest of this chapter will seek to establish our duties to the distant from a variety of ethical
perspectives (even perspectives that traditionally are thought to mitigate or obliterate our
obligation to the distant).41
To be clear, my ecumenical approach will not likely result in conclusions that
proponents of these particular perspectives might accept, but my approach is ecumenical in
the sense that it takes the central values of these ethical perspectives as such. Another
preliminary clarifier: I am not presuming that aid to the Third World take one particular form.
I merely use food aid or health aid as examples throughout this discussion. However, it is
entirely possible that these are not the most effective means of fulfilling our duty to the
distant. This is an issue I will take up in Chapter 3. For now, I will examine Narveson‘s
unpacking of the conservative-libertarian paradigm.
On Liberty and Poverty. Looking at the world hunger problem through the
libertarian paradigm is perhaps the most extensively explored perspective. Thus, I will be
drawing heavily on several authors‘ previous work for three separate arguments for duties to
the distant within a libertarian paradigm: the ―harm argument,‖ the ―conflict argument,‖ and
the ―axiological argument.‖ Although the first two arguments that I present are not
41
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particularly novel, they are important since the libertarian paradigm has been a serious
conceptual obstacle in recognizing the affluent‘s duty to the distant destitute. Even though the
third argument relies on an observation made by Aiken, it seems to be a unique contribution
to the discussion on how libertarians should view the problem of world hunger. Before
delving into these arguments, it is important to get a grasp on exactly what is meant by the
―libertarian position.‖
The ―libertarian position‖ is, according to Narveson, an entirely negative conception
of morality. Persons who endorse this conception of morality aver that one only must refrain
from causing harm to others, but otherwise they are entirely free to do what they like.
Moreover, according to this position, we have positive duties only if we acquire them by some
agreement since liberty is the central value of this system and imposing positive duties limits
the freedom of the moral agent.42 A final tenet of this position is that if any person acquires
property legitimately (e.g., if some sort of trade occurred or it was given as a gift), then
―nobody may take x from me without my voluntary consent.‖43 With this definition of the
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libertarian position in mind, consider what I refer to as the harm argument for obligations to
the distant needy.
Thomas Pogge is perhaps best known for his recent work which attempts to show that the
affluent are affecting the poor negatively. His central claim combines empirical information
from economic theories, ―...by shaping and enforcing the social conditions that foreseeably and
avoidably cause the monumental suffering of global poverty, we are harming the global poor.‖44
However, it is not immediately clear that the type of harm that Pogge is referring to is not so
causally disconnected from our actions, that we cannot be held morally responsible for them. In
other words, it seems unlikely that we would suppose, for example, that Bob could be held
morally responsible if Bob‘s calling of Jill on her cell phone results in Jill crashing her car and
creating a 20 car pile up. So how is the situation that Pogge paints about the affluent harming the
poor different? To answer this question, I will draw from observations made by Onora O‘Neill,
and from there, present Pogge‘s argument. Together, these two sets of observations form the
―harm argument‖ for generating obligation towards the poor within the libertarian paradigm.
O‘Neill claims that person A‘s right to not be killed can be violated by person B even if
the following conditions are present:
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d.

B does not intend A‘s death45

She then proceeds to support these claims up with the following examples (where aa corresponds
to condition a):
aa. A is beaten by a gang consisting of B, C, D, etc. No one assailant single-handedly
killed him, yet his right not to be killed was violated by all who took part
bb. A is poisoned slowly by daily doses. The final dose, like earlier ones was not, by
itself, lethal. But the poisoner [sic] still violated A‘s right not to be killed
cc. B plays Russian roulette with A,C,D…If A is shot and dies, then B has violated his
right not to be killed
dd. Henry II asks who will rid him of the turbulent priest, and his supporters kill Becket.
It is reasonably clear that Henry did not intend Becket‘s death, even though he in part
brought it about, as he later admitted.46
These examples are largely unproblematic. However, the fourth one may need some
qualification, so before proceeding, a caveat is in order.
It does seem morally relevant whether or not someone‘s right was violated
intentionally. No one would, for example, equally reproach someone who deliberately
committed murder and someone who committed manslaughter. However, O‘Neill‘s example
is less controversial when we consult our intuitions about how cases where actors are aware
that their actions cause harm even though that is not the ultimate end they seek would be
evaluated. Even though someone might not intend it, they may know that a direct result of
their attempt to throw rocks at a tree will be that people will be hit on the head (when they
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often miss the tree). It is immoral for this person to continue to behave this way, even if he is
not ultimately trying to hit people on the head. Thus, a revision of O‘Neill‘s condition would
be this:
d2. B does not intend A‘s death, but B knows that A‘s death (or another‘s) will likely
be a side-effect of their actions.
Even this revision, however, does not adequately qualify O‘Neill‘s claim. We can
easily imagine a situation in which an individual may be morally justified in engaging in an
action that will likely result in the death of another. Suppose that a doctor must perform a
surgery to save the life of a mother who is in labor. Suppose further that the surgery will
likely result in the death of the unborn child. Assuming that the unborn child has rights, the
doctors actions are still justified since he is attempting to accomplish some moral good. This
is, of course, the doctrine of double effect.47 A final revision of O‘Neill‘s principle that takes
this into account, then, is this:
d3. B does not intend A‘s death, but B knows that A‘s death (or another‘s) will likely
be a side-effect of their actions and B is not attempting to accomplish an action of
morally comparable significance.
O‘Neill then suggests that a conjunction of these conditions also constitutes a violation
of A‘s right not to be killed.48 Presumably, these are the conditions that Pogge refers to
implicitly when he discusses the harm of the poor. O‘Neill‘s observations also serve to bolster
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Pogge‘s arguments against some of the criticisms that have been levied against it. With these
conditions justified, we can now turn to Pogge‘s argument.
For Pogge, the current economic order is ―unjust [and causing harm] when it leaves
social and economic human rights unfulfilled on a massive scale even while there is a feasible
alternative order under which these human rights would be much better realized.‖49 Pogge points
at a specific example of this in the WTO negotiations:
In the WTO negotiations, the affluent countries insisted on continued and asymmetrical
protections of their markets through tariffs, quotas, anti-dumping duties, export credits, and
subsidies to domestic producers, greatly impairing the export opportunities of even the
very poorest countries. These protections cost developing countries hundreds of billions of
dollars in lost export revenues.50
More examples of these structural inequalities will be discussed in Chapter 3 (where discussion
of feasible improvements for the benefit of the impecunious are discussed). For now, it is enough
to note that there is a feasible alternative to this order where human rights would be better
realized, viz., the right not to be killed would not be violated. Notice that O‘Neill‘s conditions
are present in this situation: affluent nations are not acting alone in perpetuating this economic
order, the economic order does not result in immediate death (but death by starvation from the
lack of resources that results from the economic order), affluent nations are not sure exactly who
will be affected, and affluent nations do not intend to harm the poor (although they know that a
result of their actions is harm).
Pogge‘s argument has been criticized for failing to recognize the impact that the
country‘s own government has in perpetuating poverty within its border and for failing to show
49
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that the international economic order is the main cause of poverty.51 However, O‘Neill‘s analogy
strengthens Pogge‘s argument in a way that he has yet to recognize: ―A is beaten by a gang
consisting of B, C, D, etc. No one assailant single-handedly killed him, yet his right not to be
killed was violated by all who took part.‖52 Even if the international economic order established
by affluent nations is not the main cause of death of the impoverished members of Third World
countries, affluent nations are still implicated in violating A‘s right not to be killed since even if
no ―assailant single-handedly killed him‖ A‘s right is still violated. Pogge has also responded to
these criticisms by noting that affluent nations play a part in enabling the poor leaders of poor
countries to continue to ruin their economy,
How harmful corrupt leaders in poor countries are, for example, is strongly influenced by
whether the global order recognizes such leaders, on the basis of effective power alone, as
entitled to sell us their country‘s resources, to borrow in its name, and to use the proceeds
to buy the means of internal repression.53
Even if this is not the case, now that Pogge‘s argument has been bolstered by O‘Neill‘s, his
claims seem tenable enough to assert reasonably that there may be some obligation to the
world‘s needy. This obligation, of course, would be limited to changing economic
circumstances so that the poor would not be ―harmed.‖ It is still an entirely negative duty on
the part of the affluent. The next two arguments, however, seek to establish that the world‘s
rich have positive duties to alleviate the suffering of the world‘s poor.
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The ―conflict argument‖ is the second argument that results in generating obligation
within the libertarian paradigm. This argument is offered by James Sterba in his article ―Global
Justice.‖ Although Sterba‘s argument seems to be a very important contribution to the discussion
on world hunger, it seems to have received little attention.54 Thus, presenting his argument here
has less to do with shoring up aspects of his argument that have been criticized (unlike Pogge‘s
argument) and more to do with pointing out Sterba‘s significant remarks on world hunger.
Sterba begins his article by defining liberty in a way that seems consistent with
Narveson‘s definition: ―liberty is the absence of interference by other people from doing what
one wants or is able to do.‖55 He then begins to frame the world hunger problem as a conflict
between the liberties of the rich and the poor: ―Either we can say that the rich should have the
liberty not to be interfered with in using their surplus resources for luxury purposes, or we can
say that the poor should have the liberty not to be interfered with in taking from the rich what
they require to meet their basic needs.‖56
Next, he invokes two ethical principles. The first is a slightly modified version of a
fundamental ethical principle: the ―ought implies can‖ principle. He articulates that principle this
way: ―People are not morally required to do what they lack the power to do or what would
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involve so great a sacrifice that it would be unreasonable to ask them to perform such an
action….‖57 In other words, its unlikely that I could legitimately be held morally responsible, for
example, for not attending a promised lunch with a friend when doing so would result in missing
the opportunity to see my first child being born. The second is what he calls the ―conflict
resolution principle‖: ―What people are morally required to do is what is reasonable to ask [and
in severe cases require] everyone affected to accept….‖58 This principle, Sterba claims, is in
accord with ―the generally accepted view of morality as a system of reasons for resolving
interpersonal conflicts of interest.‖59
Applying these principles to the conflict between the rich and the poor, he examines three
possible prescriptive outcomes: a moral resolution that would require the rich to give to the poor
(thereby sacrificing some of their liberty), a moral resolution that requires the hungry poor to not
take from the rich (thereby sacrificing their liberty to do so and, as a result, their life), and a
moral resolution that would ―require the rich and the poor to accept the results of a power
struggle in which both the rich and the poor are at liberty to appropriate and use the surplus
resources of the rich.‖60
Sterba then argues that accepting either the resolution that forbids the poor from taking
from the rich or allows both the rich and the poor to live in a power struggle over surplus
resources is effectively the same prescription. This prescription asks the poor to abide by a moral
57

Ibid., 135.

58

Ibid., 137.

59

Ibid.

60

Ibid., 138.

30

rule that is unreasonable for them to accept. Therefore, according to Sterba, these moral
resolutions cannot be legitimate ones. Instead, Sterba seems to argue rightly that we must accept
that the world‘s affluent have some obligation to give their surplus resources when doing so will
result in the saving of lives.61
This last (axiological) argument is going to be particularly uncomfortable for libertarians,
for it concludes that non-volunteerist positive duties are consistent with the libertarian paradigm
and that the positive duty to preserve life is a legitimate duty. Again, note that this approach is
ecumenical in that this argument proceeds from taking liberty as a central ethical value.
Liberty was certainly a central ethical value for the ―founding fathers.‖ Consider this
quotation from The Declaration of Independence, ―when a long train of abuses and usurpations,
pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism,
it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for
their future security.‖62 In this quotation, there is a rather natural connection between the notion
of the value of liberty and the logical response to valuing liberty. How much sense would it
make, for example, to say that someone valued most his children‘s well being, yet he allowed
that child to be bullied in school or allowed that child to develop unhealthy habits (e.g., poor
study habits and work ethic)? It seems, then, that Thomas Jefferson was right to make the very
natural connection between valuing something and the practical actions necessary to preserve
that same thing.
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On this account, if libertarians really do value liberty, then libertarianism cannot be an
entirely negative ethic. There must be at least one positive duty, viz., the duty to preserve one‘s
liberty. It may be questionable whether this duty is demanding enough to require that a person
make huge sacrifices. In other words, it seems unlikely that we are morally required to join
Patrick Henry in his rabble rousing rhetorical remark, ―Give me liberty or give me death.‖
However, suppose that preserving liberty was an easy duty to fulfill. Suppose that it was a matter
of, say, clicking a few buttons on a machine in your home every other day. Then, surely, if one
truly values liberty, then one ought to preserve it by clicking those buttons.
Another rather obvious observation about the libertarian paradigm is that since liberty is
the central ethical value, it attempts to provide liberty for everyone. It is not merely concerned
with one‘s own liberty. Think, for example, about Sterba‘s remarks earlier in this chapter,
liberty is the absence of interference by other people from doing what one wants or is able
to do. Interpreting their ideal in this way, libertarians claim to derive a number of more
specific requirements, in particular, a right [not to be killed], a right to freedom of speech,
press, and assembly, and a right to property.63
Again, here it is clear that the liberty of others is actually valued in society, and that this
valuing results in engaging in many positive acts. For Henry Shue, ―it is abundantly
clear…that positive duties will have to be performed. Police will have to be on the streets,
judges will have to be in the criminal courts.‖64 I recognize that it is less clear, however,
whose responsibility it is to organize and implement these particular positive duties, but it will
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be shown shortly that the positive duty to preserve the liberty of others can involve a much
less problematic requirement. To return to the aforementioned simple (and odd) example,
imagine if preserving the liberty of all the citizens in America was simply a matter of pressing
a few keys on a machine in your house.
From here, all that is necessary to show that a logical realization of the value of liberty
involves a positive duty to preserve life is to recognize a remark made by William Aiken in his
article ―The Right to Be Saved from Starvation‖: ―life…is required for the exercise of liberty.‖65
Indeed, Aiken even states that the right to life should take precedence over the right to liberty
when the two conflict. This is an overstatement on Aiken‘s part. Taking Aiken‘s remarks
seriously would require us to do things that other philosophers have shown to be contrary to our
moral intuitions.66 However, Aiken‘s remarks do contain some insight, and they provide the final
piece to my axiological argument. A formal statement of my argument is as follows:
1) Recognizing liberty as a value requires that at least minimally demanding duties to
preserve liberty should be recognized.
2) Life is a necessary precondition for the exercise of liberty.
3) Therefore, recognizing liberty as a value requires that minimally demanding positive
duties to preserve life should be recognized.
Because of the proliferation of technology, preserving another person‘s liberty half way
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across the world is literally a matter of pressing a certain combination of keys on a computer. Of
course, there is the matter of transferring funds to the individual in need, so they can get the
resources that will help them live. This raises a simultaneously absurd and interesting question:
How much is another person‘s liberty worth in dollars? This question is not unrelated to how
much we ought to sacrifice in order to preserve the lives (thereby preserving the liberty) of
others, so it will be more properly addressed by the second chapter of this thesis. However, my
argument is that if liberty is something that is (or ought to be valued), then individuals must also
take seriously the value of human life, especially when doing so comes at so little a cost.
If the above remarks are correct, then it is entirely compatible with libertarian thought for
there to be duties to distant individuals. However, there has been some concern that
libertarianism cannot be coherently be extended outside the national boundaries of one‘s
nation.67 This concern would undermine essentially all of the arguments that have been put forth
so far. Of course, these concerns have been put forth by those who reject liberalism‘s
impartiality. Thus, I will turn to a discussion on partiality and its place in the discourse on world
hunger.
On Community and Poverty. There seems to be little explicit discussion about how a
cogent partialist moral view would affect our duties to the distant. Many who have written on the
topic seem to be concerned with the project of justifying our intuitive judgments about the moral
permissibility of partialism. Thus, readers are often left with an impression that there may be
some justification of our intuitively partialistic prescriptions, but they have little idea how to
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apply them in the shrinking world. Although Virginia Held is arguing for the usage of moral
principles to provide guidance for moral agents, she unintentionally captures the aforementioned
ambiguity in her book Feminist Morality: Transforming, Culture, Society and Politics,
…we have limited resources for caring…though the hunger of our own children comes
before the hunger of children we do not know, the hunger of children in Africa ought to
come before some of the expensive amusements we may feel like providing our own
children. These are real moral problems calling to some extent for principled answers. But
we have to figure out what we ought to do in the actual context of buying groceries,
cooking meals, refusing the requests of our children for the latest toy…and sending money
to Oxfam.68
Despite this overall ambiguity, within a partialistic paradigm, there are several views that
are explicit and attempt to show that we have surprisingly little or no duty to the distant destitute.
These views ultimately rest on some conception of what a community is. Unfortunately, as
Daniel Bell notes in his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on communitarianism, ―when
community is employed by political communitarians, it seems to mean anything they want it to
mean.‖69 This section will focus specifically on one type of community and two attempts to
justify partialistic negligence of the poor based on the importance of that community. As
mentioned at the outset of the chapter, I will attempt to argue that, because of the shrinking
world, this partialism is not grounds enough for dismissing our duty to the distant because
communities are becoming less distinct, and as a result, the claim that partiality can be justified
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based on important roles these distinctive communities play in forming the identity of the agent
is becoming increasingly untenable.
This sort of partialism takes at least two forms: cultural perfectionism and meta-ethical
particularism. In the following discussion, I will be utilizing Thomas Hurka‘s definitions of
―cultural perfectionism‖ and ―meta-ethical particularism.‖ He defines cultural perfectionism as
the view that ―the good for human beings consists in developing their ‗nature‘ or ‗identity‘
[which is tied that human being‘s culture].‖70 He provides a rather lengthy definition of metaethical particularism as the view that
codes and principles…always arise within particular cultures; they are addressed to the
members of a culture as having the particular cultural identities they have and as occupying
particular roles within that culture. Morality is always our morality, in these circumstances
here. This means that the standpoint presupposed by impartial morality--outside all
cultures and making judgments about them all--is not available. Morality must be partial
because the impartialist alternative is conceptually incoherent.71
Both forms of partialism rely on the ability to make clear distinctions between
communities and/or cultural groups. These forms of partialism rest on variants of what Michael
Sandel calls ―constitutive community,‖ i.e., a community that forms the identity of the agent as a
member of that community.72 Sandel argues that conceiving ourselves as entirely independent
from our community comes at ―great cost to those loyalties and convictions whose moral force
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consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the
particular persons we are – as members of this family or community or nation or people….‖73
For cultural perfectionists the community constitutes the ―good‖ for that individual in that
cultural community. In other words, ―the good life‖ for that individual consists in realizing and
developing their identity as a member of a community. For meta-ethical particularists the
community constitutes the morality of the individual within that community. Of course, there is
some overlap between the two concepts since culture helps to determine the morality of an agent
within that particular cultural setting. Let us begin by examining what effect the shrinking world
has had on the distinctiveness of cultures.
In a shrinking world, it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between
―this…community or nation or people.‖ The cultural homogenization that has occurred as a
result of globalization is blurring the lines between, what used to be, distinct cultural groups. If
this is the case and the lines of the communities are becoming blurred, then the practical
prescriptions of caring for one‘s community will look increasingly like liberalism‘s impartialistic
prescriptions since ―globalization‖ is essentially the process of forming a global community.
Historians, political scientists, and sociologists have been pointing towards the formation
of a global community for some time now. More specifically, Paul Berman makes a comment
about the blurring of cultural lines in his book Terror and Liberalism, ―In the modern world, we
are all hyphenated personalities. ‗Nobody is anything anymore,‘ said C.L.R. James. And the
distinction between Western and Non-Western civilization looks blurrier and blurrier the more
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you try and get it into focus.‖74 There are several other interesting examples of descriptions of
cultural homogenization that I‘d like to point out.
Friedman writes about the accent neutralization centers in India. Not only are these
individuals learning English, but they are also learning how to neutralize any trace of their Indian
accent from their English.75 (Apparently, Western customers are often frustrated by an Indian
accent, which is what motivates these companies to provide accent neutralization classes.) The
homogenization extends further than accent neutralization. In ―Towards a Global Culture?‖
Anthony Smith writes,
Though individual national cultures remain distinctive and vibrant, there are also broader
European cultural patters which transcend national cultural boundaries to create an
overlapping ‗family‘ of common components. Democratic deals and parliamentary
institutions; civil rights and legal codes; Judeo-Christian traditions of ethics; the values of
scientific enquiry; artistic traditions of realism and romanticism; humanism and
individualism: these are some of the cultural patters which straddle many of Europe‘s
national cultures, to create a syndrome of repeated elements and form a culture area of
overlapping components.76
―The West‖ (as a group that was to some extent already culturally homogenous) eventually
became a very influential cultural force in the world. Theodore Von Laue‘s comments in ―The
World Revolution of Westernization‖ notes that, ―Women in China, Japan, or Africa, for
instance, admired the respect and freedom enjoyed by women in the West; by comparison, their
societies offered even less equality with men. Consumers everywhere liked Western goods
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suitable for local consumption.‖77 Ironically, one of the philosophers that anticipates the
homogenization of cultures and identities is Michael Sandel himself. In an interview with
Thomas Friedman he noted that Marx had predicted the effect globalization would have on
individuals,
Marx was capitalism‘s fiercest critic, and yet he stood in awe of its power to break down
barriers and create a worldwide system of production and consumption. In the Communist
Manifesto, he described capitalism as a force that would dissolve all feudal, national, and
religious identities, giving rise to a universal civilization governed by market
imperatives….78
It would be naïve to claim that Americanization/Globalization spreads to all corners of
the globe. As Friedman notes in his book, ―I realize that the [entire] world is not flat.‖79
However, it seems clear that even if this is not the case, there are significant portions of the
world where the culture may be considered to be sufficiently similar to one another to include the
poor within the same communities as the affluent. This cultural homogenization forces partialists
to face an issue that, to my knowledge, they have not addressed: how different must a culture or
community be in order to consider them to be a separate community? How does increasing
similarity between constitutive communities affect their ethical obligations towards one another?
To be consistent, it seems like cultural perfectionists are committed to responding to the above
question by saying that ethical obligations towards different cultural communities increase
insofar as those cultures become indistinguishable. This brings me to the effect cultural
homogenization would have on moral agents within particular cultures.
77

Theodore H. Von Laue ―The World Revolution of Westernization,‖ The History Teacher 20, no. 2 (1987): 267.

78

Ibid., 202.

79

Ibid., 375.

39

Recall, that for meta-ethical particularists the community is constitutive in that it makes
up the identity of the individual qua moral agent. Thus, it only makes a difference that cultural
homogenization has occurred in a shrinking world insofar as that homogenization results in
identical moral identities, i.e., identical moral ideals that are not necessarily tied to any one
physically situated community. There is little doubt that there has been a radical convergence, at
least officially, in moral ideals in the world.
At this point, a communitarian might object, and say something similar to MacIntyre
remarks when he recognized that there may be some similarities between one community and
another,
…moral rules elaborated in one particular historical community will often resemble and
sometimes be identical with the rules to which allegiance is given in other particular
communities…But there will characteristically be some distinctive features of the set of
rules considered as a whole, and those distinctive features will often arise from the way in
which members of that particular community responded to some earlier situation…in
which particular features of difficult cases led to one or more rules being put in question
and reformulated…in some new way.80
On one reading of this text, MacIntyre seems to imply here that one distinctive feature in
one‘s set of moral rules is enough to justify partiality. This implication, however, destroys
MacIntyre‘s basis for justified national patriotism. It is entirely likely that families or
communities smaller than a nation will have distinctive moral rules that are the result of some
specific sequence of events within that community or family. MacIntyre‘s view, on this
reading, seems to commit him to the idea that each of these smaller communities and/or
families would be justified in making decisions that would be in their best interest and not
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necessarily in the best interest of the nation. This, of course, is an unacceptable consequence
in light of MacIntyre‘s project.
Even with a more charitable interpretation of MacIntyre‘s statements in the above text,
the duties to foreigners can still be established within his meta-ethical particularist paradigm.
This interpretation might look something like this: there is some line where communities are
sufficiently alike to produce identical moral agents. It is largely irrelevant for MacIntyre if the
moral agents have similar cultural practices. These agents must be influenced and shaped by
similar norms that are shared by various communities. With the shrinking of the world, this
has become possible. Indeed, there is a sharing of ethical norms across geographical and
cultural boundaries. In other words, it is possible for individuals in India to be a part of the
same constitutive community (in the sense that their community constitutes their identity as
moral agents) as individuals in America because both groups individuals are shaped by the
same moral ideals.
According to Francis Fukuyama, this is precisely what has happened in recent history.
Liberal democracy as a normative political ideology has largely won out over competing
normative political concepts. In Fukuyama‘s words, ―for a very large part of the world, there is
now no ideology with pretensions to universality that is in the position to challenge liberal
democracy.‖81 Of course, the prevailing political ideology of a community shapes the moral
compass of the individuals within that community. This is precisely the sort of morally relevant
dependence that moral agents have on their community that MacIntyre was attempting to utilize
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to justify partiality. If it is the case, as Fukuyama points out, that individuals from varying
cultures are being shaped by the same ethical ideals, then MacIntyre‘s meta-ethical particularist
argument loses its ―particularist‖ flavor.
A final example of the collapsing of the distinctiveness of constitutive communities is, at
the risk of sounding inadequately academic, anecdotal. This particular example is especially
useful since it shows both the cultural similarities and the ethical similarities of a ―foreigner.‖
During my time in Haiti, something happened that, in retrospect, was quite amazing: I found
myself driving with my Haitian translator who was speaking English, talking about political
prescriptions within the liberalistic paradigm, while listening to the same sort of music I would
find on my American radio stations, and occasionally throwing in some religious prescriptions
based on Christianity, an ethico-religious paradigm that is shared across political boundaries. The
shrinking of the world demands that Sandel continue his list in the above quote, ―living by
[particular loyalties] is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are
– as members of this family or community or nation or people or world.‖
In sum, whether the issue of the affluent‘s ethical obligation is approached from a
libertarian or communitarian paradigm, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that there is
some ethical obligation on the part of the affluent to those who require life-saving care. From
the libertarian perspective, obligation arises because the affluent often contribute to conditions
that harm the poor, a cogent moral resolution cannot require that the liberty of the poor to
secure resources from the rich be restricted since doing so would result in their death and this
is a violation of the ―ought implies can‖ maxim, and finally, because taking seriously the
value of liberty (which libertarianism by definition does) requires that positive duties towards
42

preserving life (the necessary prerequisite for liberty) be taken seriously. From the partialist
perspective, obligation arises because the shrinking world has ensured that constitutive
communities overlap enough to establish obligations to members on opposite sides of the
globe. These perspectives cannot succeed in increasing the ―moral distance‖ between the
affluent and the world‘s poor. The moral migration of the world‘s poor from distant nations
seems undeniable. The more difficult question, however, is how demanding our obligation is
to respond to this moral migration. This is the project that I will take up in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2: SINGER’S WORST NIGHTMARE
If there has indeed been a moral migration (i.e., if the affluent have an obligation to assist
the distant poor), then we are right to say that a bystander (the affluent) ought to save a child
from the pool (donate to OXFAM). The moral migration that has occurred as a result of the
shrinking world is, however, a massive one. There are many who are in need of life saving care.
In Garrett Cullity‘s words, ―Suppose, then, that what I come across is not a pond containing one
or two children, but the nightmarish scene of a lake, or even a sea, teeming with them.‖82 The
scene is nightmarish not only because of the lives that are at stake, but also because of what it
requires a moral agent to do in the situation. On Singer‘s account, the moral agent is inundated
with moral claims to her rescue efforts. However, an entire pond of drowning children makes an
important moral difference to the situation. As Andrew Kuper points out, ―it is one thing to
expect [Singer] to save a drowning child and give up one lecture, but it is quite another-if there
are tens of thousands drowning (or starving, or ill) everyday-to expect [Singer] to devote himself
to being a lifeguard instead of a teacher.‖83
Although it seems that there has been extensive discussion on whether or not the affluent
have an obligation to the distant destitute, the discussion regarding the demandingness of our
obligation to the indigent has been far from adequate. This chapter will take up that neglected
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project. I will begin by representing some of Noggle‘s comments on the difficulties that have
befuddled philosophers in their attempt at formulating a principle of benevolence with regard to
the aid question. Secondly, I will represent and criticize some viable attempts at providing a
response to how demanding our duties are to provide for those who are suffering. Finally, I will
present and defend a principle of benevolence that circumvents the problems that Noggle notes
and the problems of the principles that I will critique. This principle might be classified as a
―moderate‖ one, and is summarized briefly as follows: our duties to behave benevolently are
limited insofar as exercising those duties requires a sacrifice of something substantively
significant (i.e., something that will result in our long term unhappiness), but our ―attitude
fitting‖ duty to begin valuing the lives of those who are perishing over other ―substantively
significant‖ endeavors is unlimited. In other words, we have a duty for our duty of benevolence
to grow in magnitude. The third part of this chapter contains a further exposition of this principle
and adds caveats to the principle. Such elaborations are an attempt to capture to complexities of
the lives of moral agents, and to pay due respect to these complexities, since previous principles
of benevolence, in addition to the fact that they seem inaccurate, also are extremely vague.
Finally, I will defend the principle from what seems to be a plausible objection that is related to
Susan Wolf‘s comments in her article, ―Moral Saints.‖ I turn now to pointing out some of the
conceptual hurdles that must be overcome if an adequate principle of benevolence is to be
formulated.
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“We Need A Fresh Perspective”
Essentially, the question of this chapter is, ―When does our ‗duty to the distant‘ become
supererogatory?‖ However, it seems that a more precise statement of the question is this: When
is our prima facie duty of impartial beneficence legitimately eclipsed by our partialistic
concerns? There have been many attempts to answer this question. Singer was the first to attempt
to answer the question.
In Peter Singer‘s ―Famine, Affluence, and Morality,‖ he suggests that our duties to the
distant ought to be carried to the point of marginal utility or to the point of other ―mitigating
circumstances.‖ Others, like John Arthur, claim that our duties to the distant are limited insofar
as performing those duties would involve a substantive sacrifice on our part (i.e., a sacrifice that
will result in long-term unhappiness). The conflict between these two views has led to a
seemingly intractable debate about the demandingness of morality, which Henry Shue comments
on in his article, ―Solidarity Among Strangers and the Right to Food:‖ ―And that would just be to
go around the circle one more time: either a person‘s general duties are limited or they are
not…At this level the logic is inescapable. We need a fresh perspective.‖84 Thomas Noggle
summarizes the difficulty of forming a principle of benevolence (as originally expressed by
James Fishkin),
Any principle of beneficence strong enough to require a person to save a life at a minor
cost becomes overwhelming when applied successively to each of the millions of people
who could be saved at a minor cost. Yet a principle of beneficence weak enough to avoid
overwhelming the agent would require so little sacrifice—permitting her to let someone
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die rather than incurring a small cost to herself—that it would seldom require any
beneficence at all.85
We are left, then, with a dilemma about how to formulate a principle of benevolence.
The first horn of this dilemma has been embraced by some ethicists who have been
willing to bite the philosophical bullet and express a position similar to this: ―In response to the
claim that affluent people should entirely devote their lives to the relief of the suffering and
crippling poverty…one‘s initial response is not so much that this claim is unjustified as that
affluent people cannot be blamed for failing to live up to this austere ideal of self-sacrifice.‖86
Indeed, it seems that Singer himself takes this view.87 The problems with this view will be
discussed later in the chapter.
The latter horn of this dilemma may not appear too unappealingly sharp to some readers.
They may ask, ―Why suppose that ethics need to be demanding at all? Why, for example, should
we not suppose that our duty merely extends to one or two children, and that we could
legitimately call it quits afterward? This approach to ethics has been justly criticized as a sort of
―yuppie ethics,‖ which sees benevolence as a matter of ―attending a few charity fund-raisers or
dropping some coins into the Salvation Army bucket at the holidays.‖88 It seems that a rather
uncontroversial definition of the purpose of morality put forward by LaFollette and May would
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demand more: ―our view is that the purpose of morality is…to set expectations that are likely to
improve us, and…improve the lot of those we might assist.‖89 Moreover, it seems that it would
also be uncontroversial to agree with LaFollette and May when they state that morality should be
―…like any goal which enables us to grow and mature: they must be within reach, yet not easily
reachable.‖90 With this understanding of morality in mind, consider Singer‘s suggestion about
the degree of demandingness to the distant. The principle of benevolence that I would like to put
forth in this chapter, seeks to avoid both horns of the aforementioned dilemma, but before
formulating this principle, I will attempt to show why other principles of benevolence are
inadequate.
Why Singer’s Principle is Conceptually Nightmarish. Singer suggests that we are
obligated to assist those who are in need of life saving care until we sacrifice something of moral
significance or, in his stronger moral principle, something of comparable moral significance.
Since Singer is a utilitarian, ―something of comparable moral significance‖ can only mean that
affluent members have a duty to help the deprived until they have reached the point of ―marginal
utility.‖ Specifically, Singer defines marginal utility this way, ―the point at which by giving more
one would cause oneself and one‘s dependents as much suffering as one would prevent in
Bengal.‖91
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This conceptual path leads to a rather stark contradiction with our intuitive expectations
of our obligations to others. Consider, for example, what this principle would demand of a father
with children. If David Hume was right in noting that, ―It must also be confessed, that, wherever
we depart from this equality, we rob the poor of more satisfaction than we add to the rich, and
that the slight gratification of a frivolous vanity, in one individual, frequently costs more than
bread to many families, and even provinces,‖ 92 then Singer‘s suggestion of carrying our duties to
the distant to the point of marginal utility would demand that a father never purchase toys or
presents for his child, since the suffering the child will endure as a result of not receiving the gift
is unlikely to be as great as the suffering that a distant child will encounter as a result of not
having food. To be sure, this bumps up against moral intuition concerning our filial obligations.
It is very likely, for example, that a child‘s well-being is enhanced by providing them with some
activities that they enjoy.
There is another case that shows that Singer‘s strong principle will conflict with moral
intuition: Judith Thomson‘s violinist. In Thomson‘s classic example, a moral agent wakes up to
find he is biologically connected to a famous violinist, who needs that person‘s kidneys in order
to continue to survive.93 If we apply Singer‘s utilitarian ethic to Thomson‘s violinist situation,
then it would be correct to say that we are morally obligated to stay connected to the violinist for
nine months (or nine years). These two cases show that Singer‘s principle cannot help us resolve
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the issue of how we should proceed when our duties to the distant conflict with our duties to the
not-so-distant.
John Arthur offers some additional relevant criticisms of Singer‘s strong principle in his
article, ―Rights and the Duty to Bring Aid.‖ His main contention is that Singer‘s strong principle
leaves to little room for our personal life projects and desires. He isolates the importance of our
personal projects with a rather ingenious example. He asks us to suppose that a woman has a
choice between leaving her husband or staying with him. She knows that either action will cause
the same amount of happiness. Suppose further, however, that she desperately wants to leave her
husband because doing so will allow her to pursue some important life goals. Arthur (rightly)
claims that according to Singer‘s principle, she ought to flip a coin in order to determine how she
should act in the aforementioned example.94 He thereby reduces to absurdity the notion that our
goals and projects are not relevant. Arthur has shown that our goals are at least minimally
relevant in making moral judgments.
What about Singer‘s weaker principle (the principle that states that we ought to give to
OXFAM until we sacrifice something of moral significance)? John Arthur criticizes Singer‘s
weak principle as ―too weak.‖ He seems to argue correctly that the lighter principle can be
avoided very easily. Singer provides two examples of morally irrelevant things: dirtying your
clothing and looking well dressed. Specifically, he counters Singer‘s claim by noting that it is not
irrational to believe that looking well dressed may be morally significant if ―you think aesthetic
values are intrinsic you might well dispute the claim that being ‗well dressed‘ is without moral
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significance.‖95 Similarly if a person is made happy by purchasing new clothing, then even
Singer would have to admit that that is morally relevant. As I‘ve mentioned before, Singer‘s
attempt at being ecumenical gets him into trouble in his account of obligation, which purposely
leaves the notion of ―morally significant‖ unanalyzed. Arthur offers an alternative principle after
criticizing Singer‘s, but I will leave this principle unexamined until the next section.
Why Frankena’s Principle Fails. William Frankena in, ―Moral Philosophy and World
Hunger‖ suggests that we limit the obligations of the affluent toward the poor by adopting a
method that rule-utilitarians have used to mitigate the force of the obligations that act-utilitarian
theory generates. This method involves using moral principles for the ―designing, assessment,
and modification of social institutions, practices, roles, and rules, as opposed to taking moral
principles as rules on how we ourselves should act.‖96 In the case of world hunger, Frankena
argues that we should work towards setting up institutions and systems that will result in
everyone having the basic necessities. For him these institutions are ―an adequate economic
system‖ and ―the institution of family.‖ Thus, ―every agent…is to act according to the rules of
the system or systems there are and, especially and urgently, to do what he, she, or it can do to
bring into existence a system that will get everyone fed…‖97
The problem with this approach, however, is in the word ―urgently.‖ Frankena has
offered what appears to be a helpful way to think about obligation towards the poor, but he has
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not answered the question of how demanding our obligation is. He argues that moral principles
should not be directly applied to individuals, for this application would result in overwhelming
obligation. Frankena, however, has left us absolutely in the dark about how hard we should work
towards creating and altering institutions that will assist the world‘s poor. Should I, for example,
drop out of college and begin to write letters every day to my representatives expressing my
discontent with the current set of international economic institutions? Or perhaps I should devote
my life to trying to become a high ranking member of the WTO so that I can alter policies and
create helpful institutions? Or perhaps it will be enough for me simply to vote for candidates that
I believe will further the cause of the poor? Essentially, Frankena‘s answer to the question how
hard we should be working to help the poor is, ―pretty hard,‖ which is not very helpful at all.98
The Imperfection of Noggle’s Imperfect Duty. Thomas Noggle‘s suggestion about the
limits of the affluent‘s obligation to the indigent is perhaps the most complicated and most
impressive out of the responses I have encountered. He suggests that the duty to aid the world‘s
poor be understood as an imperfect duty. He contrasts this imperfect duty with Kant‘s perfect
duty in the following passage,
Kant claims that whereas a perfect duty requires a…specific action or omission, an
imperfect duty requires the adoption of an end…When a person adopts an end, she thereby
commits herself to a policy of choosing actions that would promote the end and avoiding
actions that would thwart it. Having a policy to promote an end does not entail maximally
promoting the end; rather, it involves adopting a propensity to promote it. Having a
propensity to A does not imply that one As at every favorable opportunity…I suggest, then,
that moderates should regard beneficence as requiring an agent to treat the welfare of
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others not just as an intrinsic end, but as one of her fundamental concerns or ‗ground
projects.‘ A ground project is an intrinsic end whose pursuit is fundamental to the
meaningfulness of the life of the person whose end it is.99
Noggle then goes on to explain what adopting an ultimate, intrinsic, end would mean in
terms of ―resource allocation‖ and priority with other adopted ends. Specifically, he explains that
moral agents would not sacrifice their ground project for some other non-fundamental end, and if
they do, we can call into question their commitment to their ground project. He provides a rather
useful example of the interplay between ends and ground projects,
For example, suppose that Jamie has set watching the final game of the World Cup as an
intrinsic but non-ultimate end, while the welfare of her spouse, Carl, is one of her ultimate
ends. If Carl suffers a heart attack during the game, we would expect Jamie to sacrifice the
end of watching the game in order to help Carl. But we would not expect Jamie even to
consider sacrificing Carl‘s welfare to avoid sacrificing her end of watching the game. Nor
would we expect her to consider sacrificing Carl‘s welfare simply to better promote her
end of watching the game.100

Noggle then proceeds to point out that the sacrifice one makes for promoting and ultimate end
must be ―significant‖ in order to be considered a morally relevant sacrifice. Drawing on the same
example, he explains this by saying that ―If Carl hates soccer and finds it irritating that Jamie
likes to watch it, then Jamie‘s choice to watch the game might annoy Carl, causing a slight
decrease in his happiness. But it would be hyperbole to accuse Jamie of sacrificing Carl‘s
welfare to watch the game.‖101
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Noggle seems to have laid the foundation for a rather helpful way of looking at our duty
to the distant. Upon closer examination, however, we can see that his theory of imperfect duties
are better fit to describe instances such as a parent‘s relationship with a child or a husband‘s
relationship with his spouse (as in the above example). Applying Noggle‘s notion of imperfect
duty to the world hunger situation seems deeply problematic because every action we take that is
not in the interests of those who are in need of live-saving care is a significant sacrifice of their
well-being. In fact, it will often result in their death, which certainly seems significant. To return
to Noggle‘s analogy, affluent moral agents are in an analogous position to the example described
above: they are in a position where they have to choose between Carl‘s well-being (because of
his heart attack) and watching a soccer game.
From this observation, all that is necessary is to point back to Noggle‘s definitions in
order to see that his theory falls apart. If we adopt the caring of distant others as a ―ground
project‖ and an ―ultimate end,‖ then we should not sacrifice this ultimate end for some other
non-ultimate end.102 To continue using Noggle‘s soccer game example, if Jamie chooses to
purchase the soccer game on Pay Per View, she does so at the cost of several children‘s health in
the Third World. According to Noggle‘s definition, Jamie cannot make this sacrifice and still be
considered to have the well-being of distant others as an ultimate end.
After a look at these attempts to ―limit‖ the affluent‘s duty to the world‘s poor, it is not
surprising that Henry Shue argued that ―we need a fresh perspective‖ on this issue. The next
section is an attempt to provide that fresh perspective.
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Building a Benevolence Principle
I have attempted to show that the benevolence principles offered by three thinkers are
inadequate. Singer‘s principle is inadequate because it is counter-intuitively demanding and it
conflicts with filial obligations. Frankena‘s principle fails because it offers no advice on how
demanding the obligation to ―bring into existence a system that will get everyone fed‖ is. Finally,
Noggle‘s imperfect duty cannot capture the nature of the affluent‘s obligation towards the
indigent because every action that the affluent takes that is not on behalf of the poor is a
substantial sacrifice of their well-being. If the above statements are correct, then a new principle
of benevolence is needed to describe (and limit) the affluent‘s duty to the distant. In this section,
I will attempt to formulate a principle of benevolence that will avoid the aforementioned
difficulties.
John Arthur provides a principle of benevolence after criticizing Singer‘s principle in his
article, ―Rights and the Duty to Bring Aid.‖ His principle forms the foundation of my attempt to
build a principle of benevolence, so I will start by presenting his principle. Next, I will argue for
certain qualifications and additions to this base principle until an adequate principle of
benevolence is formulated. This particular principle of benevolence seeks not only to avoid the
aforementioned difficulties of other principle buts also seeks clarity. Previous principles have
been, as mentioned earlier, extremely vague.
Arthur‘s alternative principle of benevolence (henceforth PB) is this:
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PB1: If providing lifesaving care will not result in a substantive sacrifice, i.e., something
that would cause a long term decrease in happiness, then one ought to provide lifesaving
care.103
What Arthur means by ―happiness‖ is something that needs to be clarified. For Arthur, happiness
consists of both objective and subjective components. Objectively, individuals need, for
example, ―food, clothing, health care, housing, and sufficient training to provide for oneself.‖104
Subjectively, Arthur thinks that certain psychological facts ―need to be weighed‖ in order to
determine if something is substantively significant. It may be the case, for example, that a moral
agent A may have a particular attachment to their collection of baseball cards, then selling them
might have a long-term effect on their happiness. On the other hand, a moral agent B may not
care at all about the collection of cards. For moral agent B, selling the cards in order to bring aid
is morally obligatory, according to Arthur.105
The definition of happiness that Arthur puts forth, however, does seem to be a bit
shallow, so I will begin constructing my principle of benevolence by making a slight alteration to
Arthur‘s definition. Arthur‘s long-term happiness seems to invoke a sort of hedonic conception
of happiness (i.e., the kind that might be associated with a utilitarian view). When I employ the
term ―long-term happiness,‖ however, I mean something closer to an Aristotelian conception of
happiness. In other words, I mean happiness in the eudemoniac sense of the word, the kind of
happiness that relates to human flourishing.

103

Arthur, ―Rights and the Duty to Bring Aid,‖ 47.

104

Ibid.

105

Ibid.

56

At this point, I have given little reason for the reader to suppose that a long-term decrease
in happiness should count as more morally relevant than the lives of the indigent. As mentioned
earlier, a consequentialist conception of the duty to the distant will not allow for individuals to
choose themselves over others. To provide an account of our duty to the distant that is in line
with our intuitive judgments about morality means that we must assume that there is some sort of
moral multiplication that occurs when the value of the wants of the individual is considered
versus the value of others is considered so that when the moral calculus is complete, it is morally
permissible for an individual to choose to further some of the partialistic ends. It is precisely this
moral multiplication for which I seek to give an account. This moral multiplication is, of course,
a sort of partialism, but the justification of this partialism rests on notions that are separate from
constitutive community (since the comments in the previous chapter would render a partiality
based on constitutive community conceptually useless).
Judith Lichtenberg claims that overturning Singer‘s principle with partialist
argumentation is actually an easy conceptual matter, ―The opponent may argue that what we
would have to sacrifice (our ‗projects,‘ the ability to lead lives, within certain limits, pretty much
as we choose) is ‗of comparable moral importance‘‖ when compared to aiding the poor.1 It turns
out, however, that, for reasons partially discussed in the previous chapter, justifying partialism in
the case where other individuals are in need of life saving care is extremely difficult. In fact, it
seems providing an account for this moral multiplication is impossible with value-based
concepts. In the first chapter, I attempted to show that liberty as a value could not be a reason to
shield the affluent from any obligation to the poor because life was a necessary pre-condition for
liberty, and if liberty is valued, then the life of the poor must also be valued. The same could be
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said about Lichtenberg‘s ―life projects.‖ If a person‘s ―life-projects‖ is the value that justifies
partiality, what about the life projects of those who are perishing while an affluent individual
pursues his life projects? Essentially, whatever value we are ―counting in‖ when we are making a
moral judgment will run into the same problem: If I value life projects/liberty, then I ought to
pay attention the extinguishing of life projects/liberty that dies along with those to whom the
projects/liberty belonged. It would seem, then, that a moral concept that avoids this value
problem must be located in order to justify partiality.
Nagel offers autonomy as a justifiable reason to depart from the concerns of ―agentneutral‖ morality or what seems to be an entirely consequentialist and impartial morality. 106
According to Nagel, autonomy is inextricably linked to ―attachments to our own desires,
commitments, personal ties and the like.‖107 This link between autonomy and attachments to our
own desires seems to justify the pursuit of a certain moral agent‘s happiness. It avoids the
aforementioned value problem because as autonomous agents we stand in unique relation to our
own ―desires, commitments, personal ties,‖ etc. In other words, it is not as though moral
judgments are rendered from an impartial perspective by weighing certain values, which would
run back into the value problem. Instead, moral judgments are determined from an agentcentered perspective. This agent-centered perspective does indeed seem to have some ―moral
magic‖ as MacIntyre suggested.
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Autonomy has enjoyed a long history of respect by ethicists as something that is morally
relevant. Typically, respecting autonomy is considered to be the prevailing moral imperative
even if respecting autonomy means that the overall good will be decreased. It is easy to see why
this is the case by imagining an example where the overall good could be increased, but only at
the cost of violating another‘s autonomy. Suppose, for example, that an individual enjoyed
smoking. Intuitively, we would find it morally reprehensible if a benevolent (but misguided)
genius brainwashed this moral agent so that he/she no longer desired to smoke. We would find
this morally reprehensible even if the former smoker lived a longer life as a result of the actions
of some benevolent brain-washing genius. Autonomy, then, is that morally relevant concept that
can limit the obligation of the affluent, and now that the partialism that is implicit in PB1 has
been justified, I can begin an addition to the principle.
In his article, Arthur recognizes that one can become increasingly able to provide for the
impecunious without making substantive sacrifices depending on one‘s current attachment to
certain luxury goods, yet, oddly, he leaves this observation unanalyzed.108 Adding to PB1
requires that we pay more careful attention to this observation than Arthur himself did.
Arthur‘s lack of attention to this observation has led to a defective principle. This
problematic aspect of his principle can, perhaps, best be illustrated by an example. Suppose that
Phil is a moral agent who has been convinced by Arthur‘s principle (PB1), and Phil happens to
be a football fanatic. Phil is so fanatical about his fantasy football league, in fact, that to peel his
eyes from his TV for one minute to attend to a benevolent act (aside from his duties as a citizen,
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father, etc.) would constitute a substantive sacrifice on his part. While Arthur‘s principle would
maintain that this fantasy football fanatic is fulfilling his obligation, it is difficult not to suspect
that there is something missing if his behavior continues this way until he dies. It seems likely
that the reason we expect more of this individual has something to do with LaFollette‘s
definition of morality as a goal that should stretch us as individuals. Thus, Arthur‘s principle of
benevolence seems too weak in that it fails to prescribe moral growth.
The following is a modified principle that is meant to take this into account:
PB2: We are required to give until we sacrifice things of substantive significance and that
we ought to be striving to grow in our joy of beneficent acts so that the ―sacrifices‖ we
make for the sake of the world‘s poor look less like ―sacrifices.‖
This may appear to be an absurd and strong position to take. However, it does not seem too far
removed from a virtue ethics approach to the issue. In aretaic terms, the aforementioned
proposition might read: we ought to be the sort of person that increasingly finds happiness in
benevolence. Indeed, this is precisely the notion that we find in the most seminal text on virtue
ethics. In Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle‘s argues, ―…someone who does not enjoy fine actions
is not good; for no one would call him just; e.g., if he did not enjoy doing just actions, or
generous if he did not enjoy generous actions, and similarly for the other virtues.‖109
Phil the football fanatic can provide an excellent illustration for what I mean by the above
addition to the PB1. Suppose that Phil has a near death experience. After he narrowly escapes
death, he comes to the realization that he has not been valuing his life and the lives of others in
the way that he should, so he begins to volunteer as a tutor for inner city children. After Phil‘s
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shift in values, he can tutor disadvantaged children without feeling like he is making some sort of
huge sacrifice. Before, on the other hand, he valued his time participating in fantasy football so
much that tutoring children without becoming unhappy was impossible. PB2 calls for this sort of
transformation to occur in the lives of affluent moral agents. They ought to begin to value the
lives of the desperately needy so that sacrifices on the part of the affluent seem less like
sacrifices. I will refer to the value shift throughout the rest of the discussion as an ―increase in a
moral agent‘s capacity for benevolence.‖
The next addition to PB2 requires that I both clarify and qualify how moral agents should
go about preserving their happiness. First, PB2 does not take into account the fact that frequently
there is no single action that can cause our long-term unhappiness. A failure to take this into
account seems far from capturing the truth about happiness and life. Consider an alteration of the
example that Al-Noor Nathoo borrows from Thomas Nagel to illustrate this point: expensive
New York dinners for two could be sacrificed and the result would be that many lives would be
saved.110 Now, it is likely that such a dinner could be sacrificed without a long-term sacrifice in
one‘s happiness. However, a continual sacrifice of such a dinner might result in a loss of
happiness between the married couple that usually enjoyed those dinners. According to Arthur‘s
principle, it seems like a moral agent should sacrifice dinners (and all superfluous expressions of
care) with her husband until she feels that her relationship is about to fall apart since these
sacrifices, individually, will not affect long-term happiness as long as the relationship maintains
intact. This seems more than a little morally obtuse.
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Instead, it seems like moral agents should identify those projects or relationships that they
consider to be substantively significant, and be morally permitted to pursue those projects as they
see fit even if sacrificing individual efforts towards the project will not result in a long term
decrease in happiness. In other words, If Singer identifies ―being a professional philosopher‖ as
something that is substantively significant he is not required to skip work and go save drowning
children in a pond until he is on the verge of being fired. He is morally permitted to attend work
every day even if missing one day of work by itself will not result in a substantive sacrifice on
his part. Similarly, it is morally permissible for the aforementioned hypothetical wife to spend
money on an expensive dinner (as an expression of care) if she identifies her relationship with
her husband as something that is substantively significant. These two examples refer to what I
will call ―the moral permissibility of attending to substantively significant projects.‖
To take this aspect of moral life into account, then, would require a reformulation of PB2,
which is stated as follows:
PB3: If providing lifesaving care will not result in 1) a substantive sacrifice on the part of
the moral agent or 2) an abandonment of attending to substantively significant projects
then one ought to provide lifesaving care, and one ought to grow in one‘s capacity to
behave benevolently.

There is another important moral issue that arises when one considers how PB3 would be
put into practice. The principle seems to morally condemn an individual expressing care for a
close friend when doing so is not necessary for that agent‘s long-term happiness. It condemns,
for example, a moral agent for purchasing a Christmas present for his good friend or for a family
member. It is possible for an individual to say to all of those close to him, ―I will no longer be
purchasing anything for any of you, since I will be donating all of my non-necessary funds to
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OXFAM.‖ Moreover, it is possible that all of his friends may accept this and continue to be in
relationship with this ―saintly‖ fellow, thus, that individual would not be in danger of making a
substantive sacrifice.
In fact, according to PB3, the expressing care for another is only permissible if doing so
would allow a moral agent to maintain a relationship for the sake of that moral agent‘s
happiness. Arthur‘s principle (and PB3), then, demands that friendships and family relationships
are only morally relevant enough to demand our attention in an instrumental sense, i.e., only
insofar as contributing to these relationships contributes to the long-term happiness of the moral
agent. This is an unacceptable result. It requires moral agents to treat others merely as a means to
an end: that agent‘s happiness. To take this into consideration requires that the principle be
restated:
PB4: If providing lifesaving care will not result either in 1) a substantive sacrifice on the
part of the moral agent, 2) an abandonment of attending to substantively significant
projects, or 3) a substantive sacrifice of those close to the moral agent who could benefit
from that moral agent‘s benevolence, then one ought to provide lifesaving care, and one
ought to grow in one‘s capacity to behave benevolently.
With this addition, PB4 also takes into account the moral relevance of filial obligations. Singer‘s
principle was rejected earlier precisely because it failed to take into consideration filial
obligations.
Before discussing the objections to this view, there two important clarifications need to
be made. The first clarification is an answer to the question, ―How demanding is the duty to
grow in our capacity to be beneficent?‖
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Not answering this question would make be guilty of precisely the type of shortcoming
that Frankena exhibited when he attempted to put forth a principle to limit the obligation of the
affluent. Recall, that he argued that principles of morality should not be applied to persons
directly, but rather, that individuals should work towards enacting institutions what will allow for
everyone to be provided for. Also recall that the question that was left in answered by Frankena‘s
question: how demanding is the obligation to bring about these institutions?
In the same way that someone would be led to ask about how demanding one‘s duty is to
bring about institutions that ensure justice, the reader might also be led to ask: How demanding
is our duty to grow in our benevolence? Should I, for example, change my major to psychology
and begin studying self-behavior modification and empathic development, so that I can grow in
my benevolent capacities? Or is it enough to live life in a ―normal‖ fashion and take whatever
sort opportunities to grow more benevolent as they come? For the same reasons that I argued that
our duty to behave benevolently towards the poor should be limited by PB4, the duty to grow in
our capacity for benevolence can be checked by, essentially, the same principle. Thus, we are
obligated to grow in our ―feats‖ of benevolence insofar as doing so does not require substantive
sacrifices on our part, an abandonment of substantively significant projects, and a sacrifice of
something substantively significant for those that are close to the moral agent.
To second clarification is a response to this question: How are moral agents to choose
when they have to decide between an act that will allow them to develop benevolence and an act
that will result in saving the life of a child? How, for example, is Peter Singer supposed to
choose between watching a documentary that will elicit empathetic development and between
attending a fundraiser whose proceeds will go to OXFAM when doing both will result in a
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substantive sacrifice on his part? There are two reasons to think that, if a person is to choose
ethically, she ought to choose the first option.
The first is that moral development is or, according to LaFollette‘s definition of morality,
should be a life project of a moral agent. This ―life project‖ is the same sort of endeavor that
mitigates our obligation to the poor in the first place. The project of becoming moral is a project
that is related both to the moral agent‘s happiness and/or related to the moral agent‘s autonomy.
The second reason is that growth in moral development will inevitably lead to more lives being
saved in the future. For example, if I have to choose between saving x lives now, or engaging in
actions that will force me to forgo saving x lives, but will allow me to save 2x lives later at a
consistent rate, then I ought to engage in actions that will contribute to my moral development.
Growing in benevolence can be an ambiguous business, i.e., it is not always clear what
one needs to do in order to grow in one‘s ability to become more benevolent (although I will
provide some suggestions for this in Chapter 3). Benevolence development should be regarded as
a duty that requires specific actions, even if those actions are not always clear. At first glance,
this ambiguity might seem intolerable, but it is no different from the ambiguity that we expect
moral agents to respond to in every choice they make. In other words, behaving morally is not
always a clear-cut enterprise, yet we intuitively expect moral agents to make the best of that
ambiguity and to strive to behave morally when they have the opportunity. In the same way,
even though growing in benevolence is an ambiguous endeavor (in that it is not always clear how
to do this), a person can still be reasonably expected to grow in their capacity for benevolence.
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In Defense of Moral Saints: A Reply to Wolf’s “Moral Saints are Annoying” Objection
Those who are familiar with Susan Wolf‘s article, ―Moral Saints‖ have probably
recognized by now that the picture I‘ve been painting of the moral agent that can satisfy the
extent of her obligation towards to the poor will look strikingly similar to Wolf‘s ―loving saint,‖
and thus be subject to all of her criticism of the ―loving saint‖ being an ideal for us to aspire to.
What follows, then, will be a representation of Wolf‘s criticisms, an explicit explanation as to
their connection with the aforementioned principle of benevolence, and a response to the
criticisms that Wolf makes against moral sainthood.
For Wolf, the loving saint cannot practically develop both moral and nonmoral virtues.111
She contrasts the loving saint with the rational saint by noting that the loving saint behaves in an
unctuous manner because the loving saint‘s desires and happiness aligns with the demands of
morality.112 In other words, the loving saint is made happy by her moral acts, which is analogous
to the notion that our duty to the destitute never results in our unhappiness and that we have a
duty to grow in our ability to help the destitute without it constituting a lack of happiness on our
part. By moral virtues, Wolf means those virtues that we typically ascribe the predicate moral
too. Virtues such as patience, benevolence, and ―niceness‖ all typify Wolf‘s (and, according to
her, our commonsense conception of moral virtues). By nonmoral virtues, Wolf means
developing proficiency at nonmoral activites such as ―playing the oboe‖ or ―improving [one‘s]
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backhand.‖113 A complete lack of these nonmoral virtues, according to Wolf, will result in a life
that ―cannot be superimposed upon the ideal of the moral saint‖, and this life is ideal in some
sense.114 In Wolf‘s words,
…one prefers the blunt, tactless, and opinionated Betsy Trotwood to the unfailingly kind
and patient Agnes Copperfield; one prefers the mischievousness and the sense of irony in
Chesterton‘s Father Brown to the innocence and undiscriminating love of St. Francis. It
seems that…we look in our paragons of moral excellence for people whose moral
achievements occur in conjunction with or colored by some interest or traits that have a
low moral tone…115
Vanessa Carbonell‘s remarks in her article, ―What Moral Saints Look like‖ can be used
to respond to some of Wolf‘s criticisms. A part of Wolf‘s argument rests on the claim that moral
saints are, essentially, annoying people. Carbonell responds to this claim by discussing a counterexample: Dr. Paul Farmer.
Dr. Farmer is indeed a moral saint, but he does not suffer from the character defects that
Wolf describes. In Carbonell‘s words, ―[Wolf‘s] saint is irritating, obsessive, and bland; Farmer
is charismatic and funny. Her saint is holier-than-thou and no fun to be around; Farmer attracts
friends and followers like a magnet.‖116 Farmer ―takes no salary…sleeps no more than four hours
a night…he lives alternatively in a hut and the basement of his own office…he does not buy new
clothes…he has little time to himself…‖117 Despite his undeniably saintly life, Farmer displays
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the attractive sarcastic quality that Wolf explicitly argues is not possible for saints, which
contributes to their unattractive nature.118 Thus, it would seem that Wolf‘s claim that moral saints
are necessarily unattractive people to be around stands refuted. To be clear, it is not my claim
that no moral saints are unattractive to be around, but rather, that it is possible to behave like a
moral saint without being annoying.119
Wolf makes some more serious claims, however, about the defects of a moral saint that
are not addressed by Carbonell‘s comments.120 Wolf claims that the moral saint necessarily
misses out on important and valuable aspects of life. Specifically, she claims that a loving saint‘s
willingness to happily sacrifice non-moral goods (e.g., his fishing trip) for moral ones (e.g.,
aiding a sick neighbor) calls into the question how much the moral saint ―loves‖ the non-moral
goods in the first place. From this claim, she argues that there is a ―kind of joy which the Loving
Saint, either by nature or by practice, is incapable of experiencing.‖121 To things could be said in
response to her claim.
The first response is that someone who is not a Loving Saint has a similar inability to
experience a ―kind of joy‖: the kind of joy associated with happily performing moral acts in
situations that require sacrifice. So, even if it was the case that Loving Saints are actually
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detached from non-moral goods, one could say the same thing about those who are not Loving
Saints, i.e., one could say that those that are not Loving Saints are detached from the joy of moral
acts.
Second, there is reason to suspect that there is not a necessary connection between a
willingness to happily sacrifice something and a lack of valuing the object that is being
sacrificed. All that is required for an individual to happily sacrifice a non-moral good is that they
value the moral good more than the non-moral good. Again, there is no necessary devaluing of
the non-moral good. It is intuitively possible that a father can value both his career and his family
and when he is placed in a position where he has to choose, he can happily choose his family.
This choice tells us only that he values his family more than his career. If he makes this choice
joyfully and ―at the drop of the hat‖ that may say more about the father‘s knowledge of what he
values than what he doesn‘t value. Thus, he can still be capable of experiencing the joy of
valuing his career. Clearly, a moral saint could be placed in this same situation.
Wolf‘s second more serious (and questionable) claim is that there is something
distinctively disturbing about morality serving as the ultimate goal of an individual. The
disturbing nature of moral passion is supposed to stand out over and above a passion for
something non-moral (e.g., playing tennis). In her words,
A person who is passionately committed to one of these latter concerns might decide that
her attachment to it is strong enough to be worth the sacrifice of her ability to maintain and
pursue a significant portion of what else life might offer which a proper devotion to her
dominant passion would require. But a desire to be as morally good as possible is not
likely to take the form of one desire among others which, because of its peculiar
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psychological strength, requires one to forego the pursuit of other weaker and separately
less demanding desires.122
Wolf‘s criticism here rests on a definition of ―morality‖ that is questionable. Once this definition
is corrected, it seems that Wolf can only condemn a morally passionate life in the name of
morality, which reveals that her criticism is self-refuting.
Wolf would like to separate out her normative concerns and label them as arising from
the point of view ―personal perfection.‖ However, upon closer examination, her prescriptions
seem to be moral prescriptions. They involve a normative component, and this component makes
them moral claims. Kant‘s division of normative claims is useful here. Normative claims can be
divided into hypothetical imperatives and categorical imperatives. Her claims do not have the
form of a hypothetical imperative. She intends her claims to apply across the board and without
qualification to every individual. Thus, if Wolf claims that we should not allow moral concerns
to dominate our lives, she is making a moral statement. Wolf can only condemn a life that is
saturated in morality by making a moral statement, which means that morality can apply to a
moral agent‘s entire life. If this is the case, then Wolf cannot consistently have a problem with a
moral saint who lets morality be the guiding concern of their life. For these reasons, Wolf‘s
criticisms do not pose a problem for PB4.
In this chapter, I have pointed out the conceptual difficulties in formulating a principle
that describes how agents ought to morally respond to the world hunger issue, shown ―we need a
fresh perspective,‖ built a principle of benevolence, and defended this principle against a
plausible objection. With the extent of the duty to the distant clarified, perhaps Singer‘s worst
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nightmare can end, and principle of benevolence that was ―built‖ in this chapter can shield moral
agents from the deluge of moral claims that could demanded from them.
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CHAPTER 3: ESCAPING THE PHILOSOPHER’S VICE: FULFILLING
OBLIGATION IN A SHRINKING WORLD
It seems as though philosophers have neglected a crucial question concerning our
obligations to the needy: How do we fulfill those obligations? Indeed, a common remark at the
end of many articles on the topic all express similar sentiments: our obligations to the
impecunious are more far-reaching than many of us are currently prepared to act on.123 Even
Peter Singer has recognized this and mitigated the strength of his moral demands on his website
―The Life You Can Save‖ (a site dedicated to raising funds for the poor) in order to prevent
people from becoming discouraged at the demandingness of morality.124 This preoccupation with
conceptual issues and a lack of concern for pragmatic implementation is perhaps a vice that
philosophers are particularly susceptible to. David Crocker, a founding member of the
International Development Ethics Association, confirms this when he notes, ―unfortunately,
preoccupied as they were with the task of justifying aid to distant people, most philosophers
evinced scant interest in institutional and practical issues.‖125
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When philosophers have attempted to provide suggestions on how world hunger ought to
be dealt with, these prescriptions have been, at best, parochial and, at worst, inimical. Indeed,
Amartya Sen wrote at one point, ―The focus on food per head and Malthusian optimism [as a
means of helping the poor] has literally killed millions.‖126 There seems to be widespread
agreement that the typical philosophical prescriptions to solve the World Hunger problem have
been both economically and politically naïve.
Three philosophers in particular have some incisive and important criticism. Thus, the
first part of this chapter will be devoted to representing the criticisms of some of the typical
suggestions to solving world hunger (e.g., donating to OXFAM). While I agree that these
criticisms adequately show that the attempts to end world hunger have hitherto been parochial,
they do not show that NGO‘s like OXFAM play no role in ending world hunger. Moreover, in
this section, I will attempt to provide some prescriptions that, on a collective level, will be
effective in ending world hunger.
The second part of the chapter will provide some suggestions on how we (as individuals)
ought to attempt to end world hunger/poverty. Often times, as LaFollette notes, the ―...strongest
barrier to helping those in chronic need is more psychological than philosophical.‖127 Martin
Hoffman, a psychologist that specializes in empathic development, suggests that empathy is a
key factor in motivating moral behavior. He notes that there are many studies that have
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attempted to show this empirically.128 Thus, for the individual prescriptions, I draw on some
insights that Michael Slote and Martin Hoffman have discovered on the connection between
empathy and motivation for moral behavior. More specifically, I will utilize some of the research
discussed in Hoffman‘s Empathy and Moral Development, to represent some suggestions on
empathic development, which seem key to providing the psychological motivation for affluent
members of society to fulfill their ethical obligations.
In keeping with the practical flavor of this chapter, I, in the last sections, would like to
address some more practical objections. Specifically, I will address the notion that aid is self
defeating and the claim that the massive economic breakdown that could result if affluent
individuals assist the poor serves as a legitimate reason to free us from our obligation to the poor.
In response to the first practical objection, I will represent William Aiken‘s criticism of the ―selfdefeating aid argument,‖ which points out that the arguments rests on false conception of a
nation‘s carrying capacity. For the second objection, I will argue that proper aid for the world‘s
global poor does not involve an abandoning of our economic growth. In fact, it seems that
properly appropriated dollars will have a ―boomerang effect,‖ i.e., as more and more nations are
lifted out of poverty, there will likely be some long term benefits for developed nations‘
economies.129
The lack of concern among philosophers for how to motivate a practical solution for
fulfilling our obligations misses out on what Anthony Weston refers to as the essence of ethics:
―Ethical problem solving is not just a matter of finding a way out of a specific, practical fix. It is
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also an occasion to better live out our values and, indeed, to better the world itself. That, is the
very essence of ethics!‖130 The third chapter, then, could be seen overall as an attempt to escape
the aforementioned philosopher‘s vice.
Practical Suggestions: Vacationing, Donating, Structurally Adjusting, and Motivating To
End World Hunger
Social/political prescriptions aimed at ending global poverty have generated a vast
literature and controversy on the nature of development economics. The controversy could be
broadly categorized as a debate between those who embrace a neo-liberal globalization paradigm
(i.e., those who think free market solutions are the only effective ones) for economic growth and
those who think that structural and institutional reforms are the key to ending poverty (e.g.,
Pogge). Before delving into this debate, however, two prefatory points should be made.
Notice that in the above paragraph, I stated that the current debate centered on how to end
poverty, not world hunger. Global poverty was not always the center of the debate. World hunger
was seen as the major problem facing the Third World during the 70s when Singer wrote his
article. As economists‘ and philosophers‘ understanding of the issue developed, however, they
began to realize that the real issue plaguing persons in the Third World is not necessarily a lack
of food, but instead, a lack of purchasing power.131 Amartya Sen notes that Bengal famine of
1943 serves as a case in point,
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In the great Bengal Famine of 1943, in which about 3 million people died, food availability
per unit of population was not particularly low and was, in fact, 9 per cent higher than in
1941 when there was no famine. The famine victims…suffered a drastic decline in their
market entitlements due to their wages and money earnings not keeping up with the rise in
food prices, resulting from demand-fed inflationary pressure in a war-boom economy…132
So, the focus of theorists rightly shifted from solving the problem of world hunger to solving the
problem of global poverty. This shift in focus is only a practical one. Even though this shift has
occurred, for the purposes of this moral discussion, I intend my conclusions to apply to
individuals who are in need of live-saving care, who just happen to be most effectively helped
when they have sufficient access to economic resources, for it seems that the moral status of
lifting individuals out of poverty is another discussion entirely.
With a task as huge as ending world hunger, it is easy for one to wonder at the outset
whether or not it is actually a possibility. ―No matter how much I give,‖ a skeptic might say,
―there will never be enough to go around.‖ However, David Crocker points out in his article,
―Hunger, Capability, and Development‖ that there have been enough resources to provide basic
nutrition for all since the 1960s.133 Pogge, for example, provides an interesting statistic that
shows how a small change in resource allocation could be made that tremendously help the poor.
He suggests that a global resources dividend (GRD) be set up that contains 1% of the resources
of the world‘s affluent countries, which is approximately 320 billion annually. This amount is
approximately 86 times the current amount of money that is spent on developing countries. 134
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Effective Aid. Perhaps it is appropriate to begin a discussion of the aforementioned
debate with Singer‘s article, which, in many senses, started the debate among philosophers about
how to end world hunger. For Singer, the solution to poverty is quite simple: donate to OXFAM.
Singer seems to think that ―Expert observers and supervisors, sent out by famine relief
organizations or permanently stationed in famine-prone areas, can direct our aid to a refugee in
Bengal almost as effectively as we could get it to someone in our block.‖135 If it really was that
simple, however, there would be little to debate.
In an article entitled, ―More than Charity: Alternatives to the Singer Solution,‖ Andrew
Kuper argues that Singer‘s solution is largely off base, and he considers some important aspects
of the global poverty debate. For Kuper, charity is not the panacea for poverty. He points to
…the well-documented failure of relief efforts in recent decades [as] a powerful indicator
that a structure-sensitive approach to development is indispensable to any wise, humane
program or philosophy of right action. Consider, most starkly, the perpetuation and
intensification of the Rwandan conflict and the human misery aggravated by aid agencies
that sustained refugee camps. In spite of the camps becoming bases for militiamen
and incubators for cholera, the prospect of international NGO aid encouraged people
not to return to their homes even when it was safer to do so, thus intensifying and
prolonging the conflict.136
For these reasons, he is an advocate for cautionary charity, but for Kuper, charity is not enough.
In fact, Kuper argues that charity can be harmful in a more direct sense than the above example.
If improperly appropriated, it may, for example, ―increase the power and hold of a kleptocratic
elite.‖137
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Kuper suggests rather surprisingly that ―we may do better for South Africans by buying
furniture and clothes from ethical manufacturers and manufacturers in developing countries than
by donation. Adequate employment opportunities, for instance, are the leading determinant of
people‘s ability to provide for themselves and their families.‖138 With this fact in mind, Kuper
implicitly suggests a rather surprising method of fighting poverty: take a vacation. He notes that
tourism generated 476 billion dollar worldwide last year, but that sub-Saharan Africa only took
2.5% of the market. He then asks us to imagine ―what a tremendous difference it might make to
poor people in the region if that number could be brought closer to 10 or 15 percent.‖139
To be sure, this is an important point. Even if it is the case that money can be more
effectively distributed by charities, purchasing products from ethical manufacturers may provide
a means for affluent individuals to simultaneously acquire goods which are substantively
significant (i.e., goods that have a long-term effect on happiness) and to aid the world‘s poor.
Kuper‘s suggestion is important not only in the sense that it may provide a way for funds to be
properly appropriated so that the world‘s poor can begin to provide for themselves, but also
because the win-win situation that it creates can provide extra motivation for affluent individuals
to engage in economic transactions that eventually result in persons being saved from starvation
and privation.
For a problem as complex as world hunger, however, aid is not the only viable solution.
Both of the solutions that have been discussed so far are not structural solutions. A structural
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solution, as its name implies, involves changing the economic order itself in order to ensure more
equitable distributions.
Stopping Starvation-Starting-Systems. Onora O'Neill begins her article, ―Ending
World Hunger‖ by noting that ―While the political independence of former colonies is now
virtually complete, the trade and economic policies of former imperial powers and other
powerful developed nations may hinder development.‖140 Recall that in Chapter 1, I noted
Pogge‘s argument about the harmfulness of the current economic policies. In the above
quotation, O‘Neill describes precisely the sort of harmful arrangement that is currently crippling
development in the Third World.
According to the 2000 edition of the World Development Report (henceforth WDR),
unfair tariffs play a significant role in crippling the economies of developing nations.
Development economists estimate that approximately 20 billion dollars (40% of aid in 1998) are
lost annually because of the current system of tariffs.141 The tariffs on agricultural products in
particular are especially damaging.142 Pogge also makes note of an article in the Economist that
corroborates the information found in the WDR. Recent studies have shown that ―rich countries
average tariffs on manufacturing imports from poor countries are four times higher than those on
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imports from other rich countries‖ and that ―[poor countries] could export 700 billion more a
year by 2005 if rich countries did more to open their markets.‖ 143
Peter Singer points out another factor that contributes to starvation starting systems: the
use of wheat and corn for products other than direct consumption. He points out two uses in
particular: the conversion of corn into biofuel for the vehicles that drive around the Western
World and the production of meat to fill the stomachs of the affluent. For example, for every
thirteen pounds of grain that is used to feed a cow, one pound of meat is made ready for
consumption by an affluent meat-eater. He argues in The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End
World Poverty that the decrease in available wheat goods causes an increase in the price of
wheat.144 This increase in price is especially harmful to the poor since, as noted earlier, the
problem with world hunger is caused more by a lack of purchasing power than by a lack of
available food.
Neo-liberals, however, have typically argued that non-free market solutions (like
adjusting tariffs) will do more harm than good. Indeed, for years a debate raged on about which
strategy was more effective to reducing global poverty. Fortunately, it appears as though there
has been some recent consensus about the economic means necessary to tackle the problem of
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poverty.145 The consensus, in addition to being justified by extensive research, is also supported
by an intuitively plausible claim: that something as complicated as attaining material well-being
of millions of different people across various cultural and geographical boundaries does not lend
itself to solutions that ignore all of those variables. In other words, it is unlikely that either
entirely free-market or more structurally focused solutions work all the time in all places.146
Thus, it appears that Pogge, Singer, and Kuper‘s solutions are viable options for making strides
towards ending poverty in at least some regions.
Social Entrepreneurship. What Friedman refers to as, ―social entrepreneurship‖ is
another potentially excellent way of fulfilling obligation in our shrinking world. If it is the case
that the economic activities of one area can have negative far-reaching impact in other areas (as I
hope to have shown in Chapter 1 and earlier in this chapter), then this method seems to be
working in the opposite direction via the same mechanism of change: economics. Jeremy
Hocksenstein represents a typical attempt at a social entrepreneurial venture. He started a dataentry firm in the capital of Cambodia, Phohm Penh. He hired mostly former Cambodian war
refugees, paid them twice the minimum wage, and offered scholarships so that they could
complete high school.147 The business boomed and several other offices were opened in other
cities. Hockenstien‘s business partner, before he started working, was living in a refugee camp.
Now, they collaborate and create ―better futures for people working at the bottom and the top.‖
This particular business venture also affords affluent companies in the north the opportunity to
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invest in ―creating better lives for some of the poor citizens of the world.‖148 Even these macrolevel solutions, however, must be started by individuals who are very motivated. Thus,
describing methods of motivating individuals to care more about the distant destitute is the topic
of the next section.
Motivating Motivated Duties of Benevolence. The preceding chapters have done much
work in logically motivating the acceptance of duties to the distant. However, it seems that often
times, as LaFollette notes, the ―...strongest barrier to helping those in chronic need is more
psychological than philosophical.‖149 Thus, it seems necessary to motivate the duty-bearer
psychologically to perform the duties that have been motivated logically.
The current level of donations of affluent individuals is far from ideal. They are both
inconsistent and inadequate. The World Development Report notes that there was a decline in
the 90s of support of vocal individuals who encouraged aid to Third World countries.150
According to the report, these individuals suffered from ―aid fatigue‖ (This is an important
psychological phenomenon to understand since it is often a barrier to sustained aid efforts, but
this will be addressed later). Indeed, Kuper complains in the article mentioned earlier about the
capriciousness of development aid.151 Moreover, the percentage of the affluent‘s income spent on
aiding the poor has declined steadily since the 1960s. In the 60s, affluent individuals spent about
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1 dollar on aid for every 2 dollars spent on recreation. Now, that number is 50 cents, i.e., for
every 2 dollars spent on recreation, 50 cents is spent on aid.152
How can affluent individuals become more motivated to behave in a benevolent manner?
Martin Hoffman, a psychologist who specializes in empathy and moral development, suggests
that empathy is a key factor in motivating moral behavior.153 For Hoffman, ―empathy‖ is defined
this way: ―an affective response more appropriate to another‘s situation than one‘s own.‖154 In
Hoffman‘s Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and Justice, one
paragraph in particular presents a slew of experiments that show how powerfully empathy can
motivate moral behavior,
Berndt (1979) found that a group of empathic sixth graders who discussed a sad incident in
another person‘s life donated more time to making pictures for hospitalized children than
did empathic children who discussed a sad event in their own lives. Davis (1983) found
that college students who obtained high empathy scores on a paper-and-pencil measure
donated more money to the Jerry Lewish Muscular Dystrophy Tlethon than did their less
empathic classmates. Empathic college students were more likely to volunteer and put in
more hours of work at shelters for homeless families (Penner, Fritzche, Craiger, &
Freifeld, 1995)…155

Understanding why the current level of giving is both so capricious and so low requires
an understanding of the various modes of empathic arousal. With a clearer picture of the
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empathic processes in mind, subsequent prescriptions for increasing motivation to end world
hunger will be more forthcoming. Thus, I will briefly represent Hoffman‘s five modes of
empathic arousal. Next, I will relate these modes to the problem of world hunger and the distant
destitute specifically with the intent of pointing out which modes of empathic arousal are
available to the distant affluent. Again, these prescriptions are meant to be psychologically (and
ethically) useful in motivating the affluent members of ―the global north‖ to fulfill their duties to
those in abject poverty.
Hoffman divides the five modes of empathic arousal into two types. Three of these
modes, are preverbal, automatic, and ―essentially involuntary.‖ Hoffman calls these modes
―mimicry,‖ ―direct association,‖ and ―conditioning.‖ The final two modes are ―higher-order
cognitive modes‖: ―mediated association‖ and ―role-taking.‖156
A close examination of the first three modes of empathic arousal reveals that they are
often cognitively ―out of reach‖ for affluent individuals. Hoffman defines mimicry as ―innate,
involuntary, isomorphic response to another person‘s expression of emotion.‖157 A mother and
child, for example, often exhibit mimicry when they interact. Mothers will involuntarily mimic
the facial expressions of their child and the child will mimic the facial expression of the
mother.158 Mimicry plays a role in arousing empathy because of something Hoffman calls,
―feedback.‖ If a person‘s facial expressions mimic the expressions of those who are suffering,
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then the facial expression of that individual causes them to feel emotionally upset.159 In other
words, an individual‘s facial expression can cause them to feel certain emotions. The second
preverbal mode of empathic arousal occurs via direct association when cues from the victim‘s
situation remind the observer of a similar experience they have had.160 Finally, conditioning,
plays a role in empathic arousal when individuals are repeatedly exposed to a stimulus that
produces a certain affective response. Hoffman provides a helpful example, ―…presenting adults
with a fear-producing danger signal (shock electrodes) along with another adult‘s fearful facial
expression, results in fearful faces becoming conditioned stimuli that evoke fear in the subjects
even when the shock electrodes are removed from view.‖161
The remaining two modes, on the other hand, are largely voluntary: mediated association
and role-or perspective taking. Mediated association is, perhaps, the most common form of
empathic arousal that is used in the affluent-indigent interaction. As the name implies, this mode
shares some similarity with direct association. Both direct and mediated association involve an
observer becoming empathically aroused as a result of a victim‘s distress reminding the observer
of a similar experience they had. Hoffman describes it as a mode of empathic arousal that is, for
example, a result of listening to a third party‘s description of a victim‘s peril or hearing a victim
cry out.162 Role-taking, as its name implies, occurs when the observer puts themselves ―in the
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shoes‖ of the victim.163 With the modes of empathic arousal explained, I now turn to explaining
why the distance between affluent and the indigent is so psychologically problematic.
The first three modes require that the victim be ―present‖ in order for them to be
activated, and this is precisely a limitation of these modes about which Hoffman explicitly makes
note.164 The distance, therefore, makes the affluent-poor interaction psychologically difficult. It
prevents spontaneous exposure to the circumstance of the other. Thus, three out of the five
modes of empathic arousal are cognitively out of reach. It seems that this has a particularly
devastating effect on motivating moral agents because these three modes are the involuntary
modes of empathic arousal, and thus, they may be the most effective in motivating pro-social
behavior.
The other two modes of empathic arousal are higher order processes, and they are
voluntary. The non-automatic nature of these processes means that they can be avoided by moral
agents. This phenomenon has actually been captured by experimentation. Agents will
deliberately avoid being empathically aroused because they are unwilling to incur the cost of
relieving a victim‘s distress. College students, in one particular experiment which observed this
phenomenon, were more likely to choose a non-emotionally charged appeal for help from a
homeless man rather than an emotionally charged appeal.165 These other modes also seem to be
weaker forms of empathy, and this makes the affluent-indigent interaction less likely to result in
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benevolent behavior. The verbal communication that is involved in mediated association, for
example, ―dampens‖ empathic arousal.166
Another problem with the distance between the affluent and indigent is this: it prevents
the cognitive and emotional reward of seeing that one‘s actions had a positive effect on the
individual in distress. This, according to Hoffman‘s research, is an invaluable step in the
empathic process. Empathic arousal leads to empathic distress and an observer can only
experience empathic relief once they believe that the individual is no longer experiencing
suffering.167 It is possible that we may be more psychologically motivated to save a drowning
child in a pond because of our past experience with empathic relief. On the other hand, donating
money to OXFAM does not provide a direct experience of empathic relief. Rather, the person
who donates has to imagine the good that his funds will accomplish.
The distance, however, is not the only problem with the world hunger issue. Because the
world hunger issue involves the intense suffering of so many individuals, it is likely that agents
who are exposed to the issue of world hunger also experience, what Hoffman calls, ―empathic
over-arousal.‖ He defines it this way, ―an involuntary process that occurs when an observer‘s
empathic distress becomes so painful and intolerable that it is transformed into an intense feeling
of personal distress, which may move the person out of the empathic mode entirely.‖168 Of
course, a person who is ―moved out of the empathic mode‖ is less likely to behave in a
benevolent manner.
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If the situation was not psychologically desperate enough, moral agents must also
contend with a ―here and now‖ and ―familiarity‖ biases that are, according to Hoffman, inherent
properties of empathy. ―Here and now bias‖ is the description Hoffman gives to the phenomena
of agents being more willing to help those who are currently present even if doing so violates
principles of fairness or justice.169 Familiarity bias, as its name implies, occurs when agents are
more likely to favor those who have similarities to them. One experiment found (surprisingly)
that men, for example, are more likely to help men in distress.170
For these reasons, the deck is stacked against motivating moral agents to fulfill their
obligations to the distant. There are, however, some important things that can be done to improve
the likelihood that the affluent will fulfill their obligations. More specifically, the presentation of
the problem of world hunger can be changed so that the problems presented by empathic overarousal, bias, and distance are less problematic. These prescriptions seem especially important
since many of the presentations of the problem of world hunger rely on methods that seem
counterproductive to motivating individuals to care for the distant poor.
Although statistics are one of the favorite methods of conveying information about world
hunger and although they are often informative, based on Hoffman‘s observations, I recommend
that those who are interested in motivating others to solve the problem of world hunger use them
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sparingly, if at all.171 Instead, more visual media should be used to convey the information that is
typically communicated via text. Statistic-filled text arouses empathy via mediated association.
On the other hand, Hoffman suggests that visual media can play a role in aiding empathic arousal
towards distant others since, as noted earlier, visual stimuli are more powerful activators of
empathy.172 In addition, if visual representations featured facial expressions, then the
representation would also recruit mimicry as a mode of empathic arousal.
In addition to being ineffective at arousing empathy, statistics are likely to become a
source of empathic over-arousal, which clearly is counterproductive to the goal of motivating
support. Indeed, Singer cites a study in his article in Newsweek that seems to be evidence that
anecdotal (rather than statistical) presentations of the problem of world hunger are more effective
motivators of action:
In an experiment, one group was given general information about the need for donations,
including statements like ―Food shortages in Malawi are affecting more than 3 million
children.‖ A second group was shown the photo of a 7-year-old Malian girl named Rokia,
and told that she is desperately poor, and that ―her life will be changed for the better by
your gift.‖ People in the second group gave more.173
Anecdotes (rather than statistics) also allow readers to hear or read about experiences that
may trigger empathic responses via mediated association. Also, anecdotes which highlight the
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similarity between emotions and struggles of the poor and the affluent may provide the means of
reducing familiarity bias.174 Films, commercials, or articles can also ask viewers/readers to
imagine how someone close to them (e.g., a sibling) would feel if they were in a similar situation
of the distant poor. For Hoffman, this recruits familiarity bias to work in favor of motivating
action via the empathic mode other-focused role taking.175
The likelihood that empathic over-arousal will occur can be diminished if responses to
empathically arousing situations are embedded in a moral principle. In other words, if moral
agents have some idea of what and how much they ought to do, this, Hoffman hypothesizes,
provides a stabilizing effect on the empathic affect.176 This is so partly because ―semantically
integrated categorical knowledge ([the moral] principle) is stored in long-term memory (Tulving,
1972)‖ whereas empathic affect is not.177 Thus, the principle of benevolence put forth in the
second chapter is not only useful for determining the extent of the obligation to the poor, but also
for stabilizing empathic affect thereby making an agent less susceptible to empathic overarousal. Thus, presentations should contain moral principles to provide the cognitively
stabilizing effect to the empathic affect that is provoked by the visual imagery.
Finally, presentations about the problem of world hunger would benefit from including
information about the effectiveness of aid since, as noted above, distance prevents observers
from experiencing empathic relief. If Hoffman is correct in noting that experiencing empathic
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relief is a vital part of motivating moral behavior, then providing the distant affluent with a
digital experience of empathic relief will increase motivation to aid the poor. This could be done
by showing (visually) the positive effects that aid had on a previously impoverished person. The
distant affluent could then be encouraged to reflect on the images as indicators that their
donations are alleviating the suffering of distant others.
In summary, psychologically motivating others looks something like this: duty-bearers
must overcome egoistic tendencies of a refusal to be empathically aroused (because of a rejection
of the costs of being empathically aroused), deliberately expose themselves to images and
messages of individual victims of world hunger, experience empathic distress, move to relieve
that distress by acting (or donating), and experience the ―good feelings‖ that result from
alleviating distress. Reason also plays a role insofar as it allows us to construct moral principles
that stabilize the empathic affect. This can be accomplished by altering the presentations of the
problem of world hunger so that they will mitigate the negative impact distance, over-arousal,
and bias has on motivating moral behavior.
Practical Objections: Self-Defeating Aid and Economic Collapse
On Decapitating Hydras: A Response to the Claim that Aid is Self-Defeating.
One of the first attempts to increase the ―moral distance‖ between the rich and poor was
focused on a practical objection. It attacked the proposition that aid can actually affect positive
change on the situation of the destitute. Pogge‘s opening statement of his article entitled ―Real
World Justice‖ included the following criticism of philosophers‘ theories of international justice:
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―many philosophers working on global justice know too little about the real world.‖178 The claim
that aid is necessarily self-defeating seems to be guilty of precisely the criticism Pogge levies
against philosophers. Although the prescriptions of some philosophers were based on popular
population growth models that were respected outside of the philosophical community (i.e., the
Neo-Malthusian paradigm), it seems clear that even if these erroneous population models were
correct, the arguments that were put forth rest on shaky framework and equivocations, which
were the result of failing to take into consideration the facts of the ―real world.‖
Garrett Hardin is perhaps the best known philosopher who attempted to show that we
ought not to give aid to countries that have exceeded their ―carrying capacity.‖ According to
Hardin, the result of not heeding his remarks will, according to him, be something like this:
―their population [will] continue to grow unchecked and so will their ‗need‘ for aid. In the short
run, a world food bank actually may diminish the need, but in the long run it actually increases
the need without limit.‖179 Hardin would agree, then, that an apt metaphor for seeing the practice
of sending aid to countries that have already exceeded their ―carrying capacity‖ is tantamount to
attempting to kill a hydra by cutting off its heads.
More recent research in population growth, however, shows that quite the opposite is
true. It seems that offering assistance to underdeveloped regions will result in a population
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growth decrease. If this is the case, then Hardin‘s argument cannot succeed.180 Several studies
were conducted that seem to suggest that poverty results in high fertility rates, not the other way
around. Two studies in particular are especially relevant.
The first study found not only that there where nations are more highly developed the
fertility rates are lower, but also that seemed to hit on the reason why this is so,
The prevailing birth rate, coupled with mortality and morbidity characteristics of the
population, generally yield child survival expectancies, or probabilities, consistent with the
size of completed family that parents want. Increasing the chance of child survival by
improved nutrition, public health, sanitation, etc. so the argument runs, will lead to a
perception by parents that fewer pregnancies and births are necessary to secure the desired
size of the surviving family. The (child survival) thesis argues that if food aid and nutrition
programs increase infant survival, parents will desire fewer children and will be motivated
to use birth control to achieve that result.181
The second study asked parents in privation why they had so many children. Interestingly, they
saw children as a form of security against the difficult life that poverty brought, and in short, the
study seemed to suggest that ―…people are not poor because they have large families. Quite
contrary: they have large families because they are poor.‖182
However, even if these claims are incorrect and high fertility persists when aid is
rendered to these nations, there is a serious flaw in Hardin‘s argument: William Aiken has shown
that it rests on an equivocation of the phrase ―carrying capacity.‖ Aiken proceeds to criticize
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Hardin‘s argument with what, retrospectively, seems like a rather obvious observation that can
be seen as long as the world hunger problem is not viewed from the arm chair: ―humans have the
ability to artificially extend the carrying capacity of their environment [specifically, their
nation]‖ via improvements in agriculture and trade. This is not an entirely environmental matter
(as Hardin claims); it is an economic one.183 Indeed, Aiken reduces to absurdity Hardin‘s
carrying capacity argument when he notes that taking Hardin‘s argument seriously would imply
that international trade is immoral since, ―we would be assisting that nation to exceed its carrying
capacity…this is absurd…International purchasing power extends a nations carrying capacity
because this is not a biological limit – it is a complex social, economic, and political limit.‖184
In short, it seems that the neo-Malthusian paradigm of population growth is incorrect, but
even if this is not the case, philosophers like Hardin are a still a long way from demonstrating
that their concept of ―carrying capacity‖ can be taken seriously enough to eliminate any
obligations to the distant destitute.
Twin Faces of Despair. Jan Narveson‘s opinion on the moral obligation of the affluent
to the world‘s poor shifted since he wrote his article in the 70s entitled, ―Morality and
Starvation.‖ He no longer argues that the affluent have any obligation to the indigent. In a more
recent article, he makes some comments that could form the basis for another practical objection:
It is characteristic of thinkers like Singer to suppose that we can just convert Mercedes
Benzes and fine houses overlooking the Riviera into thatched hospitals in the Congo. If
you do think that, you might first have a word or two with the millions of people in this
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world who make their living by assembling Mercedes Benzes or high class condos, or who
wait tables in the fine restaurants Singer wants us all to shun.185
Narveson‘s claim here brings up an important moral objection that may arise when one
considers the economic consequences of ―shunning‖ fine restaurants and Mercedes Benzes.
The objection might be stated as follows: If affluent individuals refuse to purchase
superfluous goods and donate all their funds to charity, then the industries that thrive on
excess consumption will suffer and the desperate faces of these business owners and workers
will begin to look markedly similar to the desperate faces of the ―distant‖ poor.
A basic understanding of economics seems to show that this objection is worth
considering. In order for an economy as productive as ours to maintain its health it must produce
superfluous ―consumer goods‖ (e.g., ipods, expensive clothing and/or ―accessories‖, etc.).
Production of these superfluous goods provides jobs, which in turn provides more income for
families to purchase necessities along with more…consumer goods. Economic analyst Victor
Lebough perhaps put it best roughly sixty years ago, after the enormous growth in national
productive capacity (directly as a result of WWII), ―Our enormously productive economy
demands that we make consumption our way of life…that we transform the buying and selling of
goods into rituals.‖186 Thus, spending money on ―donations‖ to international organizations might
be seen as economically noxious. Large amounts of spending on charitable donations might
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result in massive job loss and industry collapse since the monies that would usually be dedicated
to consumer goods is diverted to the well-being of citizens of poor countries.
If this is the result of a moral prescription which instructs us to donate to OXFAM, for
example, then how should the prescription itself be evaluated? The supposition behind
Narveson‘s comment/objection is something like this: a morally favorable status should not be
ascribed to a prescription that, if it was universally followed, would result in negative
consequences. This objection is founded on premises that are both ethically and, when applied to
the problem of world hunger, empirically problematic.
Taking this objection seriously would result in some very odd conclusions about our
obligations. It would require, for example, that saving money be considered immoral since if
everyone in the nation simultaneously decided to save their money, the economy would suffer.
It would also require that becoming an artist is immoral, since if everyone in a nation became an
artist, the nation would be less prosperous (since artists presumably do not have all of the
necessary ―nation running skills‖).
Moreover, moral actions cannot be condemned because of the negative consequences
that would result from the moral action within a certain system. This says more about the
system than it does about the moral act itself, and while it may be debatable whether or not
one should perform some action in a system that will result in negative consequences, it
seems likely that a system which produces negative consequences for moral acts is morally
problematic.
For example, if a German citizen encountered a Jewish person in distress in Nazi
Germany, he may have a moral obligation to help him. However, it is easy to image a case where
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fulfilling that obligation may result in the death of both of the parties involved. Again, here it is
debatable whether the German citizen should assist the Jewish individual within that system, but
we cannot condemn the act of helping the distressed Jew in general based on these negative
consequences because the consequences occur within a certain system that is created and
maintained by people. The system (in this case, the Third Reich) itself is immoral, and creates
negative consequences for moral acts. Similarly, national and international economic policy is a
system created and maintained by people, and widespread donation to OXFAM may cause
negative consequences. If this response to the objection is correct, then the question then
becomes, ―how can the international economic system be reworked?‖, i.e., how can our economy
be reconstructed in a way that efforts to help the cadaverous will not result in dire consequences?
This is precisely the question that I have attempted to answer with the above suggestions.
Fortunately, even if the above suggestions are not feasible, there is little reason to think
that widespread donation would lead to total economic collapse. According to estimates from the
United Nations Development program (as quoted on the ―Giving what we can.org‖ site), the cost
of provided basic health and nutrition to all those who are in need would cost 13 billion dollars,
which is about the amount of money that the United States and Europe spends on perfume.187 It
also appears that the value of economic growth and assisting other developing nations may be
reconcilable. Thomas Friedman notes that when persons in the Third World are lifted out of
poverty, they often purchase more goods, many of which include American products.188 The new
demand for American products would clearly have a positive impact on domestic economic
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growth. Aiding the Third World, then, could be seen as a long-term investment for more
developed economies.
In sum, the aforementioned objection is founded on some ethically problematic premises,
but even if that was not the case, a closer look at global economies reveals that effective aid for
The Third World can result in a win-win situation.
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SHRINKING WORLD, EXPANDING OPPORTUNITY: CONCLUDING
REMARKS
David Crocker, a former president of the international development ethics association,
notes that ―philosophers can play a role in…reducing world hunger.‖189 This thesis, then, was
written partially in the hope that Crocker was right. I began this thesis commenting on the
remarkably perpetual Good Samaritan situation the affluent find themselves in. Ultimately, I‘ve
sought to establish that the affluent have an obligation to the indigent, to understand the limits of
that obligation, and to provide practical suggestions on how to fulfill that obligation.
More specifically, I have sought to decrease the ―moral distance‖ between the world‘s
rich and poor by arguing that the affluent have an obligation to those who are in need of lifesaving care from two ethical perspectives: libertarianism and partialism. Within the libertarian
paradigm, I have argued that the world‘s affluent are harming the poor by supporting an
economic order that hinders the development of poor nations, that the distant poor present a
conflict of liberties between the rich and poor, that a moral resolution of this conflict would
demand that the rich sacrifice the liberty to hold on to their luxurious goods, and that if liberty is
truly valued by libertarians, they should take seriously the lives of the distant poor (since life is a
necessary precondition of liberty). From a partialistic perspective, I have argued that both
cultural and politico-ethical homogenization has occurred and that this homogenization is reason
enough for partialists to consider the poor within the same constitutive community as the rich.

189

Crocker, ―Hunger, Capability, and Development,‖ 225.

99

Because some of the world‘s poor and the affluent are in the same constitutive community,
partialists ought to take seriously the obligation that they have towards those individuals.
I have sought to show the problematic nature of previous principles of benevolence when
they are applied to the issue of world hunger, and to end the conceptual nightmare of attempting
to formulate a principle of benevolence that accurately describes the limits of the affluent‘s
obligation to the Third World. Singer‘s principle is too demanding and conflicts with our
intuitions about filial obligations. Frankena‘s principle contains an ambiguity which renders the
principle largely useless. Noggle‘s imperfect duty cannot be applied to world hunger because
every sacrifice (especially for achieving non-ultimate ends) that an affluent person makes of the
indigent‘s well-being is a sacrifice that results in their death. Arthur‘s principle is too weak in
that it fails to prescribe moral growth. It also fails to take into account the intrinsic moral worth
of relationships since it only allows moral agents to care for others when doing so is important to
that agent‘s long term happiness. Finally, on a more practical level, the principle seems obtuse in
that it does not allow agents to pursue projects that are substantively significant to them in a
reasonable manner. Again, here is the principle that, I believe, ends the aforementioned
conceptual nightmare:
PB4: If providing lifesaving care will not result either in 1) a substantive sacrifice on the
part of the moral agent, 2) an abandonment of attending to substantively significant
projects, or 3) a substantive sacrifice of those close to the moral agent who could benefit
from that moral agent‘s benevolence, then one ought to provide lifesaving care, and one
ought to grow in one‘s capacity to behave benevolently.
Finally, I have attempted to escape the philosopher‘s vice by providing practical
suggestions about how to end world hunger. These suggestions are largely taken from the recent
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work of Pogge and Kuper. However, I have also included prescriptions from the WTO‘s World
Development Report and from Friedman‘s work on social entrepreneurship. Essentially these
prescriptions recommend that aid be made more effective, that affluent individuals look for
products that benefit both themselves and the poor, that the international economic order be
adjusted, and that social entrepreneurship is an effective means of creating economic growth in
developing countries. On a more individual level, I attempted to show why efforts toward ending
global poverty are so weak and capricious by detailing the various modes of empathic arousal
and by pointing out the psychological difficulties that plague the affluent-indigent interaction.
Finally, I have attempted to provide suggestions based on Hoffman‘s work that, I think, will
allow moral agents to increase the capacity to behave benevolently and will allow persons
interested in motivating others to aid the poor to construct more effective presentations of the
problem of world hunger.
The obligation that we, as affluent persons, have towards the world‘s poor is indeed a
weighty one. If my arguments are correct, then it is likely that it is immoral, for me, to eat a
ChickfilA sandwich since eating there is not necessary for my long-term happiness and I can
receive comparable items for cheaper and donate the excess to OXFAM. Am I even ethically
permitted to purchase an extra copy of this thesis to keep in my personal library as a souvenir of
a rather modest accomplishment (assuming it is an accomplishment at all)? Morality does indeed
seem inconvenient and troublesome sometimes. In Singer‘s words, ―Unfortunately, for those who
like to keep their moral responsibilities limited, instant communication and swift transportation
have changed the situation. From the moral point of view, the development of the world into a
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‗global village‘ has made an important…difference to our moral situation.‖190 Is it really
unfortunate that the world has shrunk?
I am inclined to answer, ―no.‖ While it may the case that the world has shrunk and, as a
result, our obligations to the distant destitute have increased, living in this shrinking world is an
incredible opportunity. In the history of mankind, who else has been able to affect positively so
many lives in such a significant manner with such little effort? It is my hope that we can
continually see the shrinking world as a wonderful opportunity and the arguments put forth in
this thesis will aid the affluent (myself included) in understanding their perpetual Good
Samaritan status, and provide them the conceptual and practical tools necessary to act in a way
that puts the ―Good‖ in ―Good Samaritan.‖
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